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References  66Labor being by far  the most abundant resource  in low-income countries, the
determination of the returns to  labor plays a central role  in models of
development.  Any barriers to  the  reallocation of labor resources  accompanying
economic  development are potentially critical impediments  to  further income
growth.  In the  last 25 years, a great deal of knowledge has accumulated about
labor-markets  in low-income countries.  Extreme views on labor market processes
that had influenced thought for many years have been moderated by the
accumulation of empirical knowledge into a more eclectic  and empirically-
grounded approach.  This  transformation has been influenced by both new
developments in microeconomic theory concerned with information and risk
problems, critical realities of  low-income  countries, and the increased
availability of good data, which have disciplined theoretical  exercises and
helped weed out  the merely clever models from those that  inform.
One polar view of labor markets  in developing countries was that such
markets  are riddled with imperfection and/or operate quite distinctly from  those
in high-income  countries;  with low-income sometimes being taken to mean that
labor was not a scarce resource  in some sectors.  The alternative view was that
labor markets  in low-income countries conform more closely to  textbook
Marshallian markets than do such markets  in high-income countries, as  the
principally rural-based technology in such settings is  relatively homogeneous,
direct governmental interventions  in the labor market are rare,  relatively
little  of the labor  force is  unionized, and contractual arrangements are
relatively uncomplex.  There  now appears  to be important elements  of truth in
both views, although the influence of problems  in other markets, principally
intertemporal markets,  on labor arrangements  is understated in both
perspectives.
Are  there features  of low-income countries  that require special  attention
in modeling the operation of labor markets?  Certainly one  important andpervasive characteristic of low-income countries  is  the large proportion of  the
labor force  in agriculture.  To the extent that agricultural production requires
different organizations than and/or confronts problems  different from those in
industrialized sectors, labor market analysis  in such countries will differ from
those in other settings.  A second salient  feature of low-income countries  is
the low proportion of workers who earn income wholly or chiefly in the wage
labor market compared to the labor force  in high-income countries.  Workers in
family enterprises or unpaid family laborers  (the alternative employment modes)
not only dominate  the labor  force in agriculture, but make up  a significantly
larger proportion of the work force  in the non-agriculture  sector as well,
compared to  that sector  in high-income countries.  The behavior of the family
enterprise and its members, particularly in the context of agricultural
production, thus  forms the core of many labor market models depicting low-income
labor markets.
In this essay, I discuss the operation of low-income labor markets with
reference to  the models that have been and continue  to be  influential in shaping
the study of such markets.  These models are evaluated in  terms of their ability
to  shed light on the realities  of the allocation, pricing and employment of
labor  in low-income countries.  In section I, I discuss models directly
concerned with and evidence on the  employment and pricing of labor in the rural
(agricultural) sector.  I begin with those models concerned with the shadow
value of labor  in agriculture that were motivated by the highly-influential
"surplus labor" development models positing the redundancy of a large proportion
of the rural labor force  (Lewis  (1954), Ranis and Fei  (1961)).  This section is
also concerned with how rural wages are determined and their rigidity, the
social  and private costs  of reallocating labor from agriculture to  other
activites, labor supply behavior, labor market dualism and unemploymentdetermination.  Section II  is  concerned with risk-mitigating and effort-
eliciting contractual arrangements  involving rural  labor and the  organization of
the  agricultural enterprise in an environment characterized by incomplete
markets.
In Section III,  I consider the  issue of whether labor is  efficiently
allocated across  sectors and across geographical  areas and problems of barriers
to mobility.  Models of migration incorporating human capital investments,
information and capital constraints, uncertainty with respect to  employment,
riskiness  in annual  incomes,  temporary migration, remittances, and heterogeneity
in preferences and abilities  among workers are discussed.  Section IV is
concerned with urban labor markets, and addresses  issues concerning the duality
of urban labor markets  and unemployment determination.  In the final section, I
highlight  issues about which there has been little research but which appear to
be of  importance to  the study of developing economies,  in particular,  life-cycle
and intergenerational  labor market mobility.
I.  EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE DETERMINATION IN RURAL LABOR MARKETS
1.  Surplus Labor, Disguised Employment and Unemployment
Since the majority of the population of low-income countries reside  in
rural areas  and agriculture constitutes the largest industry in  terms of
employment, it  is not suprising that most of  the literature concerned with low-
income-country labor markets is  concerned with rural  labor markets.  A central
question addressed  is  the determination of the opportunity cost of removing a
laborer from the agricultural sector.  The macro development models of Lewis
(1954) and Ranis and Fei  (1961),  as  noted, presumed that in the early stages of
development, agricultural laborers would be shifted to  the industrial  sector
without any reduction  in total agricultural output.  Such economies are
characterized as  surplus  labor economies, i.e.,  the  shadow wage of anagricultural laborer  is nil.  These models also assumed that the private costs
of moving out of agriculture for an agricultural agent was his/her consumption,
approximated by the average product in agriculture.  Thus, private and social
costs of reallocating labor are presumed also to be different, the discrepancy
implying  the immobility of agricultural  labor vis a vis  the industrial sector
and representing a source of  inefficiency.
In this section, I review the combined models of household behavior and the
operation of the rural  labor market that yield the surplus labor presumptions of
these macro development models, as  in Sen (1966).  Three basic extreme
approaches have been taken in the literature concerned with the opportunity cost
or  surplus labor  issue.  In the first, no labor market is presumed to exist at
all.  In the second, labor markets  are assumed to  operate perfectly and in the
third, agriculture is  assumed to be characterized by rigid wages and
unemployment,  i.e.,  agents seeking employment but unable to  find it.
In considering these basic models,  I will employ for  the most part the same
prototype model of the agricultural household.  I will assume that the household
has multiple members,  that some members  (dependents) do not provide resources  to
the family  (do not work),  that household size and its  composition are exogenous,
that  there is  a single family welfare  function in which the consumption and
leisure  time of each member is  given equal weight, and that  the household
obtains returns from the land its members work, with the land area being fixed
in size.  Specifically, I assume that a household with n members and N workers
owns or has assigned to it a piece of land on which it  produces output X which
it  also consumes  (or sells).  The technology of production is given by:
X - F(L, A)  FL, FA >  0;  FLL <  0,  (1)
where L - Nh, h - hours of work and X  is  total output.The family welfare function is:
U - U(c,9),  (2)
where c - X/n and k =  0  - h;  i.e.,  c is  average family consumption and  k  is  the
leisure of each of the N family workers, where  2 is  the  total  time available to
each worker.  Each rural household maximizes  (2) subject  to  (1) and other
constraints discussed below.
a.  Absent Labor Markets:  the Autarkic Household
The  simplest route  to surplus labor  is  to assume  that there  is no labor
market  and that, contrary to  (2),  the leisure of household members  is not
valued.  In that case,  the only choice variable  for the household is  the number
of hours each member will work and the first-order condition for  that choice  is:
UcFL  - 0  (3)
where Uc and FL are  the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal product
of family labor respectively.  If U  is positive, that  is,  low-income households
have not reached satiety with respect  to  consumption, expression (3) indicates
that work time  is  allocated such that the marginal product of an additional time
unit of work  (hour)  by any family member is  zero.  Since this  is  optimal,
expression (3) shows that  the total output of families with the same amount of
land A is  invariant to  the number of family laborers as  long as  the work time of
family workers never reaches  the  full extent of 0  hours.  Moreover,  if a family
worker leaves  and is  not provided any resources by the family (does not become a
new dependent),  the loss  to him/her of moving out  is  c*, average familyconsumption at FL - 0.  The discrepancy between the social and private costs of
moving are due here both to  (i) the absence of a labor market and  (ii)  the
family sharing rule, for if the migrant family members still received c* when
working outside  the househo  Id, then c* would not enter into the decision to
leave.
Sen  (1966) considered an autarkic model  in which the  family welfare
function included leisure,  as  in  (2).  In that case  the first-order condition
is:
(N/n)  Uc/U  FL,  (4)
and the marginal product of an extra hour of work by the family worker  is no
longer zero.  Here, labor  is  in surplus only if the removal  of a family member
leaves the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
unchanged, since  in that case FL and total output  is unaltered.  Thus, the
existence of labor surplus depends importantly on the characteristics of the
family welfare  function;  specifically, on family members fully compensating for
the lost hours of work associated with the  loss of a family worker by increasing
their labor supply.  Sen characterizes this situation as  one in which there is
disguised unemployment, since hours of work have a non-zero marginal product but
laborers can be removed from the household (agriculture) without any loss  in
output.
b.  Perfect Labor Markets
The possibility of compensatory family labor supply leading to disguised
unemployment and surplus labor  is  independent of Sen's assumption of absent
labor markets.  Consider the perfect-labor market model in which each family
member can work as many hours  as he/she wants at  a given wage per hour and in
which labor hours  can be hired at  a constant wage per hour.  Assume,  initially,
6for simplicity, that hired laborers are perfect substitutes  in production for
family laborers.  Thus  the wage rate of a  worker  is  the  same whether he is
working on his or her own farm or outside.  What  is "perfect" about this setup
is that there is full information about the work of all  individuals and no
uncertainty about  (labor) costs or returns, features  that will be addressed
below.
It will be demonstrated below that in such a  model, the allocation of  labor
to production is independent of  the family's welfare function;  consumption and
production decisions  are separable and the household will, in maximizing its
utility, always maximize  farm profits.  Letting the maximized profit level be
given by n*, per-capita  family consumption is given by:
c - */n +  Wh(N/n)  (5)
and the  first order condition for the allocation of family work time  is:
U /Uc - W(N/n).  (6)
Note  that the shadow value of leisure for family workers is  less  than the wage
rate, since  as long as  there are dependents, per-capita consumption  increases by
less  than the  (hourly) wage rate when work increases by one hour.
To ascertain  if the removal of one worker from the family leads  to an
increase  in the work by other family members when labor markets are perfect we
can treat N  and n as variables  (ignoring, for simplicity, the discrete nature of
family membership).  In the case in which a migratory family member does not
retain his/her rights  to farm profits,  this can be expressed as a  (small)
decrease in N  compensated by an equal decrease  in n.  In that case,  it can be
readily shown that  the elasticity of leisure £  per remaining family worker withrespect to a change in the number of family workers N  is given by:
N-n  c
N  n  n  +  N(Wh-c)  e,*  (7) ,N  n  £,W
where  is the compensated own price elasticity of leisure and  £e  is the
income elasticity of leisure.
Expression (6)  contains  two terms.  The  first corresponds to  the
compensated price effect:  a reduction in the number of family workers increases
the dependency ratio  (N-n)/N, lowers  the shadow wage of leisure  (remaining
family workers must give up a larger  share of their earnings  (Wh)), and thus
decreases family labor supply per remaining worker.  The sign of the income
effect, the second term in  (6),  will depend on (i)  whether a reduction in the
number of family workers lowers or raises per-capita consumption, whether
earnings per worker Wh exceeds c, and (ii)  on whether leisure  is a  normal good,
>  0.
If we assume the normality of leisure, then (7)  indicates that when the
earnings  of a family worker is  less  (more) than per-capita consumption, so  that
there  is  a gain to  (loss of) per-capita consumption when a worker leaves the
family, the demand for leisure declines  (riseS).  Thus,  for example, if absent
family members lose  their rights  to  family income and lose  their obligations to
pool their incomes,  leisure is  a normal good, and consumption from non-earnings
income  is sufficiently high  (so  that Wh <  c),  the labor  supply of each remaining
family worker unambiguously decreases when a laborer is removed from the
household.  In that case, output declines by more than the earnings contribution
of the shifted laborer.  Note  that in the special case  in which there are no
dependents and no non-earnings  income  (e.g.,  a landless household),  the loss of
a family worker leaves the labor  supply of remaining workers unaltered--there is
neither an income effect  (since Wh - c)  nor a substitution effect.  The  loss intotal output is  thus  equal to  the contribution of  the  laborer.
The elasticity of  total family labor supply Nh with respect to  the number
of workers  N, qn,  is  1  - nhN where T=-nlTN  . The labor  surplus hypothesis of
hN
fully compensating family labor supply is  thus n  =  0;  when nhN  > 1, family
workers decrease  their labor supply when a worker leaves, and when 0 < nhN<  1,
remaining family workers increase their labor  supply but by less than the loss
in total family labor supply  induced by  the  loss of  the worker.
Estimates of  the family worker labor  supply elasticity have been obtained
by Lau, Lin and Yotoupolos for Taiwan  (1978) and Thailand  (1979),  by Barnum and
Squire  (1978)  for Malaysia, and by Strauss  for Sierra Leone  (1983) based on the
perfect labor market model.  In all of  these studies,  in which absent members
are assumed neither to  receive nor contribute  to  family income,  total family
labor supply  is  estimated to  decline when a household worker  is removed.  The
Lau et al.  studies  impose a unitary income-leisure elasticity and estimated  I to
be 1.3  in Taiwan and  .94 in Thailand;  the Barnum and Squire and Strauss studies
used a somewhat more flexible  form for the household expenditure system.  In
both of these  studies, estimates of the  income-leisure elasticity are far below
1, with n being .62  in  (Malaysia) and 0.55 in Sierra Leone,  although it was
assumed that removal  of a family worker has  only an income effect.  All of these
estimates  thus  reject  the  behaviorally-based labor surplus hypothesis in the
countries  studied.  Note, of course,  that given the  same behavioral  rules
embodied in the household model, differences  across the Malaysian and Sierra
Leone  samples  in either the mean proportions of agricultural earnings  in total
household agricultural income or  in dependency ratios, from  (7),  imply that
there will be cross-sample differences  in Tn.
Both n and a  family member's opportunity cost of outmigration depend on the
family sharing rule.  If the migrant worker retains all familial  rights and
obligations, then the relative private gain  (or loss)  from migrating dependsonly on the ratio of market wage rates at home to  those  in the new area,
implicitly assumed to be the same in equation (5).  The sign of n,  will  then
depend only on whether the migrant worker's earnings are higher or  lower in the
new setting or  in the rural market.  The evidence on migrant-family income
pooling is  discussed below in the context of the migration literature.
c.  Unemployment. Underemployment and Rigid Wages:  the  Nutrition-Based
Efficiency  Model
The third theoretical route  to  surplus or redundant labor is  to hypothesize
that there are  agricultural agents willing to or seeking work but unable  to  find
employment, unable to contribute to production.  If wages do not decline in the
face of this excess  supply of laborers, the removal of workers from agriculture
presumably leaves the number of employed people and thus agricultural output
unchanged.  The question of theoretical interest  in this approach is why wage
rates  are  downwardly  rigid.
The most  important explanation for the downward rigidity of rural wages is
the nutrition-based-efficiency wage model  (Leibenstein (1957),  Stiglitz  (1976),
Mirrlees  (1975)).  In this  framework, labor effort  (or labor power) is
distinguished from labor  time worked.  While time worked is  (or may be) a family
decision variable, as above,  individual labor effort per unit of time is
hypothesized to be a technological  (i.e.,  non-behavioral) and particular
function of individual nutritional intake or consumption at low consumption
levels.  The appeal of the nutrition-efficiency wage model  is that  it provides a
reason why low-income labor markets might be different from high-income labor
markets. In this model,  low income per  se  is  the cause of a labor market problem
(unemployment), not the reverse.  Like the  labor surplus hypothesis, however, as
will be discussed below, it  is unclear  if the model has any relevance to  any
known population on this planet.The central element of the nutrition-based efficiency wage theory  is  a
hypothesized technical association between a worker's consumption c and his work
effort A  per unit of  time.  Thus  the production function (1) is modified such
that output  is  a function of  total labor effort, rather than just labor time.
X - F(Nh(c)),  I'  >  0, F' >  0  (8)
In Mirrlees  (1976) and Stiglitz  (1976),  the work effortA -function is  given by
Figure  1.  Alternatively, as  used in Bliss and Stern (1978) and Dasgupta and Ray
(1984),  the functional relationship between c and  N is  given by Figure 2.  The
non-convexity  in the Mirrlees-Stiglitz  function gives rise  to a number of
theoretical oddities,  including the  implication that an unequal distribution of
consumption among family members may be optimal even when the family welfare
function is additive in family members' utilities.  Both forms provide the same
explanation for the possible coexistence  of unemployment and downwardly rigid
wages.
In its  simplest form, the efficiency wage theory assumes  that the consump-
tion of all workers  is provided solely out of wage income, there are no  lags
between productivity and consumption, and employers  can appropriate all of the
additional effort induced by the wage  increase.  The  latter two assumptions
imply  that the theory,  if it  is  relevant at  all, may be most appropriately
applied to longer-term contractual relationships between the worker and
employer, i.e.,  when the contractual period exceeds  the likely lag between
consumption and productivity, and in situations where the employer can monitor
the consumption of the worker (by  providing,  for example, meals at  the work
site).  While  the latter  is not uncommon,  the predominant contractual period in
many rural areas  of low income countries does not exceed one day (see  Section II
below).
The efficiency wage model also assumes that  laborers are  in infinitely














Telastic supply  at some  time wage W.  It is  easy to  show that, given  (8),  profit-
maximizing  firms may pay a time wage higher than W if W is  sufficiently low.
The firm or  employer's problem is  to  select the amount of labor and the  time
wage that maximizes profits.  Assuming for simplicity that each worker works
some standard amount of  time, then the farm or firm chooses optimally the number
of employees N and the wage paid each worker  (=his or her consumption);  i.e.:
Max F(NX(W))  - NW  (9)
N, W
The necessary first-order conditions for  (9)  yield an equation which can be
solved for the efficiency wage,  that time wage which minimizes  the cost per
level of effort, given by:
W  (10)
where  it  is assumed that c - W.  This  efficiency wage w  is  chosen such that the
average cost per level of effort just equals marginal cost  (X')-1,  or  the
tangent from the origins  in Figures 1 and 2 to  the respective X  curves.
Expression 10 indicates  that firms paying time wages below a will experience
diminished profits;  an excess  supply of workers cannot therefore bid down the
time wage below w.  The efficiency wage sets a floor to wages.
Some  immediate difficulties with this  simplest form of the  theory are that,
as long as wages are  the only source of consumption, the optimal  level of
savings  is  zero and there would be  no dependents  (Gersovitz (1985)).  Moreover,
all unemployed workers would disappear  (starve).  Leibenstein (1957)  attempts to
resolve  this latter problem by hypothesizing that employers altruistically
conspire to  lower wages below w  (and thus  their profits and total  output) so
that all workers are employed.  In that case, removal  of a worker  from the rural
area allows this  "institutional" wage to  rise.  More interestingly, outmigration
12increases total output, since all workers, now consuming more, supply more
effort until the  institutional wage rises  to just equal  the efficiency wage--the
marginal product of a laborer in this full employment equilibrium is  less than
zero.  Leibenstein labels the maximum quantity of workers who,  if removed from
the agricultural  sector, would increase agricultural output, as  the
underemployed.  This definition of underemployment, while precise, differs from
others  in the literature, discussed below.
An alternative to the employer altruism-conspiracy scenario  is  one  in which
jobs are rationed randomly on a daily basis among potential workers.  Those
workers who are hired on a given day receive  the efficiency wage and put in the
"full"  level of effort dictated by the efficiency wage  function.  On those days
workers are not hired, they do not eat.  In this case  the workers receive a  wage
lower than the efficiency wage in the expected value  sense;  a "wage" that rises
and falls  inversely with the number  (supply) of workers willing to work.  Here,
since workers  eat on some days,  they need not disappear as  long as  there are
biological  "savings."  However, this story requires  that the efficiency-
consumption relationship is strictly contemporaneous--a day's work effort is  a
function only of that day's wage  (consumption).
If the efficiency wage model  is  modified to  include alternative sources of
consumption other than wage income for  some workers, the model predicts
diversity in time wages among workers,  as  long as  employers have information
about individual workers'  circumstances (a likely scenario  in the village
economy).  In particular, the model would imply that the  time wage rates
received by workers will vary with the number of workers and dependents  in their
family and with their income from land  (land ownership holdings)  to  the extent
that employers are informed about workers' alternative income  sources and family
composition.  To see this, assume that there are  excess supplies  of landless
13laborers  so that the equilibrium wage per unit of labor effort A is w /X(A)  ,
where  c =  w for workers  from landless households.  Two polar cases have been
discussed in detail.  In one,  the employment decision is made by a monopsonistic
employer  (Bliss and Stern (1978a));  in the  other, employers  are competitive
(Dasgupta  and  Ray  (1984)).
Consider a monopsonist who can employ the landless laborers v0  at time wage
w  and v1  "landed" laborers from households in which some non-earnings  income V
is  shared among N members  (all of whom  work);  the monopsonist maximizes profits
by choosing the  time wage ~l  to be paid to  the V1  landed laborers  and optimal
quantities of v0  and v1 . The problem is:
max F(X0 (w)v 0  +  X1  (W  1)v)-V 0O  - VL10  (11)
subject to a landed laborer availability constraint vlI  1  from which it can be
shown that
X'(X)  =  X'  (  i  +  V/N).  (12)
and vl  ;=  ;  that  is,  the monopsonist pays  out wage rates  such that the
consumption of both landless and landed laborers  is  equalized.  Since this  means
that  the monopsonist pays a lower  time wage to  landed workers, wl <W ,  to
achieve  the same efficiency per worker-hour , such workers are preferred to
landless workers and landed workers will always be hired before  the landless.
Landless workers are  only hired if not enough landed laborers are  available for
work.  Among the  landed, moreover,  those with higher non-earnings  income receive
lower wages and those with more family members  (or dependents)  receive higher
wages.  The monopsonistic-efficiency wage model  thus  implies that  (i) no landed
workers  are unemployed  (if any landless workers are  employed) or, conversely,
only landless workers are unemployed, (ii)  landless workers receive higher time
14wages than landed workers, and (iii)  time wage rates are  inversely related to
sources of non-wage income and positively associated with family size or the
number of dependents  (for those with alternative income sources).
In the competitive equilibrium case considered in detail in Dasgupta and
Ray  (1984),  wage rates also differ across worker  types.  Here, because of
competition, each worker receives  the same payment per unit of work effort.
Thus those workers with higher levels of alternative consumption sources,  and
who supply more effort per time unit, command a higher time wage  in the market,
in contrast to the monopsonist case.  Thus,  if the landless are employed, they
receive  time wages lower  than workers with alternative consumption sources.  In
this case,  (i) those  (landed) workers with the highest consumption prior to
their wage employment both command the highest time wage and are the least
likely to be unemployed (note that such workers may choose not to seek work if
their non-employment income  is  sufficiently high),  (ii)  time wage rates  are
lower for those  (landed) workers with more dependents and (iii)  if the
competitively-set  effort wage implies a time wage for the landless  at or below
the efficiency wage then at  least some and possibly all landless workers are
unemployed.  An interesting and serendipitous distributional  implication of this
model is  that there may exist an equalizing redistribution of  landholdings, if
there is  unemployment under the regime of unequal landholdings, that will
increase total  output.  The reason is that  the redistribution increases the
amount of efficiency units employed by reducing the number of individuals  too
poor to gain employment.  However,  in this model the problem of the
appropriability by competitive employers of wage-induced efficiency gains  is not
discussed, a problem that  is naturally circumvented in the monopsony model.
It is  clear that a nice feature of the nutrition-based efficiency wage
model  is  its  large number of testable implications.  Despite this,  there have
been few direct tests of the predictions of the  theory.  Bliss and Stern (1978b)
15review some evidence both from the nutrition and economics literatures  (but
perform no rigorous tests of  their own).  There  are a number of different tests
possible.  The most basic would be to  test if productivity  is positively related
to  food consumption.  Another would be to test if wage rates  are related to
workers' consumption or  to  the determinants of per-capita consumption, such as
the number of dependents or  the amount of income-producing assets.  Before
considering these, however,  it  is  important to  examine empirically the central
proposition that wage rates have a floor and unemployment is  substantial in
rural labor markets, for  these are the phenomena that motivate the theory.
India would appear  to be a good country in which to  test the applicability
of the nutrition-wage efficiency theory, as  it  is  a low-income country with
reasonably good data on employment and wages.  Inspection of the 1961 Indian
Census  reveals rural unemployment rates  for males  and females of less than one
percent.  However, as noted by Sen  (1975),  the Census criteria for rural
unemployment are very restrictive.  A person is unemployed only if he or she did
not work at least one hour per day on a regular basis during the "working"
season and is  "seeking" work, where work  is  inclusive of activities in family
businesses  that provide no  direct compensation.  The National Sample  Survey
(NSS) of 1960-61, and subsequent rounds of  that survey through the  latest (1982-
83),  have constructed alternative measures of unemployment based on different
definitions.  In 1960-61,  for example, rural unemployment rates according to  the
NSS were  2.6 percent  for males and 6.5 percent for females, where  the unemployed
were defined as persons who did not work at  least one  day in a reference week
and were seeking work, criteria more like  those of employment surveys in
developed countries.  While the concept of unemployment  is difficult to measure,
whether current or usual employment status  is used, measured rates  do not
suggest that unemployment, as more or less conventionally defined, is  any more  a
16salient feature of rural  labor markets  in the second most populous country in
the world than it  is  in developed countries.  Moreover, wage rates are  quite
flexible  over the crop season in India, as  they are  in Egypt (Hansen (1969))  and
Indonesia  (White and Makali  (1979)).  It  is not clear, therefore, why a special
theory of unemployment is required for rural  labor markets.  However, the
seasonality of agricultural production implies  some  special employment problems,
discussed below, some of which may uniquely lead to unemployment.
The  lack of an overly conspicuous unemployment rate  according to the  only
data sources  available providing information on this phenomenon may not be
sufficient to convince those who understand the difficulties of measuring
unemployment of the absence of important wage-rigidities.  Thus  it may also be
useful to examine whether the distribution of (time) wage rates  in India
exhibits a floor.  In particular, if the  nutrition-productivity relationship is
stable, based as  it is on presumably biological grounds,  one would expect that
the minimum of real wages across  the year would be  similar across areas.  The
difficulty is  that computation of area-specific real wages,  at least  in a
country such as India,  is  problematic, given quite different sets of relative
prices and consumption patterns across regions.  Moreover,  the model  implies, as
we have seen, that wages will differ by the characteristics  of workers.  Thus,
inter-area differences  in family structure and in landholding patterns will
result in variations  in the distributions of time wages paid across areas.
However, the ratio of male to  female wage rates should exhibit stability across
areas  if the consumption-productivity association is stable since (i)  this ratio
is unaffected by inter-area variability in relative food prices and (ii)  males
and females may not be distributed too differentially across households
characterized by their landholdings.  Table 1 displays  the distributions of the
male-female agricultural wage ratios  across Indian districts in  1960-61, from
Rosenzweig  (1984), and for six Indian villages in the semi-arid tropics of that
17Table  1
Distribution of Female-Male Agricultural Wage Ratios  in  India:
159 Districts  in  1960/61 (All India) and Six Villages,
1974/75-1982/83, in  the  Semi-Arid Tropics
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ICRISAT Village  Studies,  1984.country in 1974-75 through 1983-84.  As can be  seen, there is  considerable
variability exhibited.  Such variation, unexplained by the nutrition-wage
theory,  of course, requires  an explanation.  One possibility  is  that the
relative number of male and female workers varies by wealth holdings.
Geographical variability in wage rates and labor supply behavior are  discussed
below.
What of wage diversity, called an "odd implication" of the nutrition-
efficiency wage  theory by one of its authors  (Mirrlees (1976))?  Do  individuals
by dint of their relationship to land receive  different wage rates  for the same
work?  Rosenzweig  (1980), using data on 700 male and 522 female  rural agri-
cultural workers  from a national probability sample of rural  Indian households,
tested this proposition.  He found that, controlling for age, weather, schooling
and some local  industry variables, a worker's wage rate in agriculture was not
statistically significantly related to  the amount of land owned by the worker or
his/her family.  He  did not test whether the number of dependents affected the
wage rate received, since this would have involved the difficult task of taking
into account the possibility, implied by fertility models  (e.g.,  Willis  (f973))
and evidence  (e.g. Rosenzweig and Evenson  (1977)),  that family size is itself a
function of wage rates.  The uniformity of sex-specific daily wages paid adult
workers  is also noted by Bardhan and Rudra  (1981)  in West Bengal and by White
and Makali  (1979)  in West Java.
There does not appear to be support  for any of the wage diversity
predictions  of the nutrition-based efficiency model nor any obvious evidence of
the phenomenon the theory was originally designed to explain, namely, the
coexistence of high unemployment rates  and rigid wages  in rural areas of low-
income countries.  What of the hypothesis that productivity is significantly
affected by food consumption, of the relationships depicted in Figures 1 and 2?
18Bliss  and Stern (1978b) and Strauss  (1986) review the  evidence  from both
experimental and non-experimental  studies.  Both studies do not find much,  if
any, rigorous supporting evidence.  One fundamental problem with the evidence  is
that food consumption is  obviously dependent on a worker's earnings as  well as
(possibly) a determinant of earnings.  None of  the studies prior to  Strauss'
work have treated this problem econometrically--that  is,  it  is not clear whether
Figures 1 and 2 merely trace out a consumption function.
Strauss  (1986)  estimated a production function similar to that  in
expression (8) based on Sierra Leone survey data, with per-capita calorie
consumption of family workers employed as a production input.  He employed
simultaneous equations methods  to  circumvent the problem that unobserved factors
influencing output,  such as  land quality, farmer ability, etc.,  will also
increase consumption  (and influence other  input allocations).  His estimates
indicate that output does  increase at a decreasing rate with per-capita calorie
consumption  (the effects are  statistically significant).  Strauss does not
attempt, however, to  test whether the relationship has a nonconvex segment, as
in Figure 1.  Of course,  the model implies that no one would be observed to be
on this segment  of the effort-consumption curve  in equilibrium.  Experimental
data may be needed.
Despite the evidence for the nutrition-productivity association, Strauss
reports  that daily wage rates  in Sierra Leone vary by season, by sex and by
region but not by the caloric demands  of the task performed.  It  is curious why
wage payments do not appear  to reflect  the nutrition-based  differences in
productivity found by Strauss.  Agents might be  ignorant of  the relationship  (or
know it not to be important!),  but more likely what bars the use of such
information, if true,  is  the difficulty of ascertaining or monitoring the  food
consumption of individual workers.  The  income-sharing egalitarian household may
"tax away" any additional earnings  of individual members by reducing their food
19allocation and workers have  incentives to  "appear" well-fed.  Only the food
consumption of family members or attached servants  (longer-term contract labor)
could be monitored and/or controlled;  but the latter form of employment is
relatively scarce; most workers do not work even from day to day for the same
employer (Strauss  (1986),  Bardhan and Rudra  (1979)).  The difficulties of
ascertaining the intra-household allocation of food are well-known to  survey
researchers;  measuring and monitoring an individual's contributions  to output
may be no less difficult than ascertaining his/her inherent productivity through
the monitoring of food intake.  Such issues of moral hazard and information
constraints are not discussed in the literature on the nutrition-based
efficiency wage  theory;  these considerations  are discussed more fully below.
The nutrition-based efficiency wage model is  only one of a set of models
developed to explain the  (second-best) optimality of downwardly rigid wages and
an excess-applicant equilibrium.  Other models include  the  labor recruitment
model of Bardhan (1979),  the screening model of Weiss  (1980),  and the turnover
model of Stiglitz  (1974).  These models have no particular relevance to  low
income rural  labor markets;  since the pervasiveness of daily labor markets  in
such settings  implies that turnover or recruitment costs are probably quite low.
The prevalence  of such spot  labor markets vis a vis other contractual
arrangements  in rural areas has not received a satisfactory explanation however.
I discuss alternative equilibrium models in the context  of urban labor markets,
where their applicability appears more obvious.
2.  The Family Enterprise Model and Agricultural Dualism
The conventional model of labor markets distinguishes between the
institutions that determine  the supply of labor  to  the market--households--and
the  institutions that utilize and demand labor for production purposes--firms.
For an important segment of the rural economy of low-income countries, both the
20demand for and supply of market labor are determined within the same
organization,the  family enterprise.  The majority of households in agriculture,
and a large proportion of households in the non-agricultural sector,  integrate
production and consumption decisions.
The modeling of the family enterprise in the context of "peasant"
agriculture has a long tradition beginning with Chayanov (1925  [1966]).  Singh
et al.  (1985) provide an excellent overview and summation of the  relevant work
concerned with modeling and econometrically estimating the  family enterprise
model  in agriculture, what they call  the agricultural household model.  A
prototypical model is  analagous  to  the standard international trade model of a
small, price-taking economy and is  similar to the perfect labor model described
in the previous sections  in which households  (i) are price-takers  for all
production inputs and consumption goods  (including lesiure) and (ii)  family and
hired labor  are perfectly substitutable in production.  In this static one-
period, perfect certainty model in which all markets exist and are competitive,
as noted, consumption and production allocations are  separable;  the allocation
of production inputs are independent of the household's preference orderings,
and thus of (i) the relative prices of goods that are  consumed but not produced
and  (ii)  the household's wealth.  Thus  all households  in maximizing their
utility also maximize profits.
The separability property of the perfect markets  family enterprise model
has important implications.  To  see  this,  consider a one-person variant of the
model.  Preference  orderings are  described by the utility function (13).
U(XC,  )  Ui > 0, Uii <  0  i - XC, £   (13)
where Xc  - good consumed, R  -leisure  time.  Given a market wage rate W  and a
price p  for the good produced according to  the technology embodied in  (1),  the
income constraint of the  "household", is:
21V  +  pF(L,A) - WL +  Wh  - pXc - V  +  - Wh  - pXc - 0
where V - income from sources other than wages and profits,  and h - - . The
household maximizes  (13)  subject to  (14),  choosing optimal quantities of labor
in production L, leisure time  , and consumption Xc.  The necessary first-order
condition for the  labor input  in production is:
PFL - W,  (15)
which is  the profit-maximizing condition.
The optimal leisure-consumption good combination is  given by  (6),  with N =
n and p - 1.  Condition (6) is  identical to that for landless households not
engaged in production activities, that merely sell labor in the market, since
their  full income constraint is  identical  to  that in (14) except thatH  - 0.
Thus,  labor supply behavior would appear  to be similar across producer-consumer
and pure consumer households facing identical prices and having equal endowments
of wealth  (V  +  n).  However, that  is not the case.  Consider the effect of a
wage change on labor  supply.  The appropriate expression, in elasticity terms,
is:
c  W(h-L*)
h,w  ~  ,w  F  ,F6
where F - full  income=  pX* - WL* + ~W +  V,  and X* is  the profit-maximizing output
level.  The  first  term is  the negative of the conventional Hicks-Slutsky
compensated own price  (wage) elasticity, and must be positive.  The second term
is  the  income elasticity weighted by the share of net labor  supply in full
income, where net labor supply  is  the difference between the  (optimal) amount of
labor used in production L*  and the  (optimal) amount of labor  supplied by the
family worker.
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(14)Net labor supply can be positive or negative.  On "large"  (small) farms,
where total labor demand exceeds  (is  less than) the amount of labor supplied by
the family, net labor  supply is negative  (positive);  that is,  labor is
"imported"  (exported).  Increases in the market wage rate  thus reduce full
income for importers of labor and increase full  income for net exporters of
labor.  Consequently, if utility functions are approximately homothetic and
leisure  is normal, households without land (exporters of  labor to the market)
will, on average, exhibit  lower labor supply elasticities  than will households
with land.  Rosenzweig  (1980) tests and confirms these  implications of the
complete markets, static agricultural householed model using Indian household
data.
Households will also differ with respect to  the responsiveness  of their
labor supply to  changes in  the price of goods that are both consumed and
produced.  The relevant elasticity expression is:
c  p(X*-XC)  (
h,p  -- T F , p   F  1,F7
Again, the income elasticity of leisure  is weighted by a term that differs
across households with different levels of prdcuctive assets but the same
exogenous wealth, in this case  according to whether the household is  a net
consumer or supplier of the X good.  A rise in the price of the agricultural
good increases  the  income of net suppliers of the X-good to  the market  (X*>Xc)
and reduces their labor supply  if leisure  is a normal good and leisure and goods
are not strong complements.  For  landless and small-farm net purchasers,
however, the price rise could increase labor supply.
Despite  these differentials in the responsiveness of labor supply to
exogenously-induced alterations in wages that are asociated with land ownership
in the complete markets model, a reallocation of land holdings does not affect
23the efficiency with which inputs are used or  total output (net of demand
effects)  in the absence of technological scale economies.  The absence of a land
market  implicit in these models  (land holdings are usually assumed exogenously
given and identical to  operational holdings) thus  is not a barrier  to efficiency
because of the free movement of labor  (and all other production inputs) across
farms.
In contrast to  the complete markets model  is  the model of the  family
enterprise in which no markets exist  (Sen  (1966)),  or, equivalently, in which
there is  a separate market for each household.  In this autarkic  or perfectly
segmented markets model, labor  in production is  always  (and can only be)
supplied to a plot of land by the household that owns  (or is assigned to)  that
land, i.e.,  h - L.  From the  first-order condition for  labor allocation in this
model, given by  (4),  it  can be seen  that a family's preference orderings affect
production.  Hence, the allocation of inputs will be dissimilar among farmers
heterogenous in wealth (financial assets)  even among farmers with identical-
sized plots of land, and, given heterogeneity in preferences or household
demographic structure, even among farmers with identical sets  of assets.
The "subjective equilibria" of the absent or segmented markets model are
inconsistent with the achievement of productive efficiency, as  the shadow or
virtual prices of productive  inputs will differ across farms;  that is,  a
reallocation of labor  across  "markets" can increase  total output.  Moreover,
unlike  in the complete markets model, a rise  in the product price, which has
both income and substitution effects on family labor supply, can induce a
reduction in output.  A  "backward-bending" output supply schedule is  likely when
what  is provided is also consumed and leisure and the consumer-produced good are
substitutes in consumption.  The "backward-bending" supply curve of family
labor, a possibility in both models, can only be reflected in the output supply
response of autarkic households, since neither income nor substitution effects
24in consumption are relevant to  the allocation of farm labor or  other production
inputs when no markets are absent.
Dualistic models of agriculture posit the coexistence of households
characterized by the  two models.  In particular, "small"  landholders do not
participate  in the labor market and are characterized by autarky, while "large"
landowners purchase labor at the market wage and profit maximize.  The
implication of this framework stressed by its proponents is  that  the poorer,
small landowners  in their subjective  equilibria will supply more labor per acre
than will  the large landowners,  since the  cost of labor  to  the larger farmers  is
likely  to exceed the subjective marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and goods  among small  farmers.  Note that absent labor markets are not
sufficient for this  inefficiency result, since  there would be  incentives for
larger farmers to  rent out their land to smaller landowners in order to take
advantage  of their  lower labor costs.  Given barriers to both  the movement of
labor  and land across  farms, the obvious prescription for the achievement of
increased efficiency and output, as  in the nutrition-based, efficiency wage
model, is  an egalitarian redistribution of  landholdings.
Empirical evidence appears to  strongly reject this  extreme form of dualism.
Evidence from Egypt  (Hansen (1969) and from India  (Paglin (1965),  Rosenzweig
(1978,  1984)),  for example, indicates that  small farm households participate
substantially  in the labor market;  indeed, as both buyers and sellers  of labor.
Dichotomization of family enterprises according to  their objective functions
(profits or  utility)  or by their isolation from markets thus appears  less
empirically relevant than distinguishing among households by their  status as net
consumers  or producers  of specific agricultural goods or net  importers or
exporters of wage  labor.  These  latter distinctions are relevant to  the
distributional impact of policies altering wage rates  (labor demand) or
25commodity prices, since we have seen that they determine the direction and
magnitude of income gains from such price changes.  Discrepancies across farms
in the prices of production inputs might exist, however,  for other reasons than
posed in the traditional, extreme dualism models.  These are discussed in
the next section.
There have been a number of econometric studies of  the complete markets,
family enterprise model;  these are reviewed in Singh, et  al.  (1986).  All of
these studies maintain but do not test the assumption of separability;  thus
estimates  of the technology are obtained separately from and independently of
estimates  of the parameters describing household preferences and consumer
demand, sometimes with different samples  (from the  same country) for each
household sector.  One additional pervasive feature of these econometric studies
is  the aggregation of family labor supply and labor demand across  sex and age
groups and the specification of one  labor price  (a "unisex" wage).  While  the
Hicks composite goods  theorem justifies aggregation of consumption goods over
individual family members, since each member faces the  same goods  price vector,
as displayed in Table 1, for example,  relative wage rates  for male and female
(and child) labor vary significantly across areas and over time.
In Rosenzweig's  (1980) study of Indian household data, it  is  shown that not
only do male and female labor  supply elasticities differ substantially, with
female  labor supply being substantially more elastic than male labor  supply (as
in developed countries), but there are important cross-wage effects.  For
example,  increases  in relative male wage rates  significantly reduce the amount
of labor supplied to the market by women (wives), while increases  in female wage
rates  relative to male wage  rates raise female  labor supplied to the market and
slightly reduce the amount of male market time.  The marked differentiation in
agricultural tasks by gender (K.  Bardhan (1984))  also suggests  that sex-specific
labor inputs are not perfectly substitutable in production, as also assumed in
26most econometric studies.
Lopez  (1985) is  the first econometric  study to  test  (and reject) the
separability  (complete markets) assumption;  however, the model formulated
assumes a specific source of non-separability--that the  time spent  in on-farm
and in off-farm activities are different  consumption commodities.  Aside from
this,  the Lopez  study, as  in all  other applications of consumer demand models,
embeds  the  test in a particular specification of household preferences  (in this
case, a specification implying linear Engel curves).  In addition, Lopez employs
geographically aggregated data (Canadian census divisions)  and ignores  labor
heterogeneity associated with sex.  Pitt and Rosenzweig  (1985),  in a more
loosely-structured econometric analysis of household data from Indonesia  (with,
however, sex-specific disaggregated labor),  performed an indirect test of
separability.  They found that while a farmer's illness  significantly reduced
his  labor supply, farm profits net of actual and imputed family labor costs were
not affected.  These results  imply that those farm households  afflicted by
illness were able  to  substitute hired for the lost family labor time with no
sacrifice  in factor returns.  The econometric evidence on separability  is,  at
this stage,  inconclusive.
The perfect markets  (separable) and segmented, household-specific markets
(autarkic) models represent polar opposites.  A more general framework for
modeling rural markets would incorporate the  possibility that the household
faces two prices in each market, a purchase price, paid by the household when it
buys the commodity, and a sale price, received when it  sells the commodity.  The
separable model assumes  that in all markets purchase and sale prices are equal.
When a wedge exists between these two prices, however, some households may
optimally choose not to  participate in one or the other side of the market or
not to transact at  all.  The existence  of distinct transaction prices  in
27particular markets thus may provide implications for observed behavior in rural
economies, but themselves require explanation.
II.  RURAL LABOR CONTRACTS:  RISK, INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES PROBLEMS
The complete markets and autarkic household models, as noted, are extreme
caricatures of rural labor markets.  While the latter appears  to be of little
relevance to  at least Asian and Latin American low-income countries and the
former may be a reasonably good approximation of the behavior of agents in rural
labor markets, with the important advantage of econometric tractability, a
number of nontrivial problems are  ignored.  First, even the daily labor market
does not operate perfectly smoothly.  Not all seekers of wage work can find
employment at  any time and not all  employees can find workers  at the market wage
when they need them.  When small-farm household members on a given day seek but
cannot find work, they are  likely to work their own land, supplying labor  on
that day up to the point where their marginal rate of  substitution between goods
and leisure equals the marginal value product of their labor time rather than
the market wage.  Similarly, on larger farms, when insufficient labor  time can
be purchased on the market,  i.e.,  the notional demand for labor at  the going
wage exceeds the amount of labor that is hired,  the marginal value of labor will
exceed the market wage.  Such frictions in the  labor market could yield the
result that  the marginal product of labor on small  farms  is  less than that on
large farms  ("weak" dualism),  although, again, such discrepancies could be
minimized if there were no barriers to  the land rental or  sales market.  Note
that  in this model,  if the probability distribution of these frictions  is common
knowledge (and appropriately specified),  the expected marginal product of labor
may not differ between  small and large farms.
Ryan and Ghodake  (1984) compared unemployment probabilities  for men and
women in the daily agricultural labor market in six villages  in the semi-arid
28tropics of India.  They found that in 13-14 percent of the  total number of days
male laborers were willing to work, they could not find employment.  Their
results did not support, however, the additional hypothesis  that small farmers
behave  as  if the opportunity cost of male labor is  the male market wage
multiplied by the probability of finding employment, although they did find
evidence of such behavior with respect to  the opportunity cost of female  labor,
Bardhan  (1979) also  concluded from his  study of Indian survey data that male
labor supply behavior is not  importantly affected by unemployment prospects,
although that of  females is.  No empirical  studies appear to  exist which
document the uncertainties surrounding the hiring of labor.  This  is peculiar,
since employers  and employees are often the same people and there  do not appear
to be any obvious asymmetries in the market.  Indeed, Bell and Srinivasan (1985)
emphasize the employee-employer symmetry of employment uncertainties in their
study of the demand for and supply of  farm servants, discussed below.
More fundamental aspects of low-income, rural  labor markets  are also not
reflected in the  complete markets model.  These include the  inherent riskiness
and seasonality of agricultural production, the absence  of an insurance market,
and information cum incentives problems.  As a consequence, the model cannot
account for such contractual arrangements as  sharecropping, the prevalence of
daily (casual) or spot markets relative to  longer-term implicit or explicit
labor contracts, or even why the family enterprise  is  the dominant agricultural
organization.
A principal theme of the rapidly-expanding literature  concened with
contractual arrangement in rural economies  is how the incompleteness of markets
(the existence of unmarketable inputs)  combined with some of  the special
attrributes of agricultural technology shape  labor arrangements.  Two  classes of
models, each emphasizing different market problems, are predominant in the
literature.  The first class  of models emphasizes  the riskiness of agriculture
29due principally to  the unpredictability of an important agricultural production
input, weather, and the absence of a market for output insurance.  These two
characteristics of the rural  economy imply that contractual arrangements  in the
labor market might contain elements that in part substitute  for the absent
insurance contracts, given risk-averse agents.
A second problem highlighted in this  literature  rests on the assumption
that "labor"  is composed of two bundled factors - time and effort  - as in the
efficiency wage models, except that effort in this context is a choice variable
and effort cannot be costlessly monitored.  While work time and work effort both
affect the utility  (negatively) of their suppliers and contribute to  output,
there is  no distinct market  for each.  The  time wage-rate alone  insufficiently
rewards  effort, which must be elicited by other means.  Thus,  in this class of
models, the utility function (2) becomes
U - U(c,,e),  (18)
where e - effort, Ue < 0, and labor is  expressed in terms of effort units in the
technology, as  in  (8).
The prevalence of the  family enterprise in agriculture can at  least in part
be explained on the basis of the problems  of production risk inherent in
agriculture and on effort incentives or  "moral hazard" problems  (Binswanger and
Rosenzweig  (1986)).  For example, family members may be more able than others to
enter into risk-sharing and consumption smoothing arrangements,  as discussed in
Section III.4 below.
The tendency for workers to withhold effort,  to shirk, without supervision
when paid only according to their  time worked is  viewed as  the principal  reason
why production costs rise after a certain point with the scale of agricultural
operations.  While payments according to  tasks performed or  output produced
30(piece rates) provide superior  incentives  to time wages, since they directly
reward effort,  such arrangements are not feasible where haste can cause damage
(weeding or apple picking).  Thus,  farm operations  cannot be performed
exclusively with workers paid by piece  rates.  Family labor  is  seen as  superior
to hired labor, since  family laborers are residual claimants on the profits-of
the family enterprise, as  in the model described by equations  (1),  (2) and (5);
their consumption levels are thus  directly tied to  their work effort.  As  the
number of family members increases, however, the  share each individual  family
member receives  from family  profits  is diluted.  Thus,  there is  a natural upper
bound to  the optim al  size of the family  labor force and to  the  size of
agricultural operations.  Large landowners  can avoid hiring  (time) wage laborers
by renting their  land out in smaller parcels  to  other families,  since land
tenancy transforms non-family  workers  into residual  claimants with the
accompanying  incentive efficiencies.
Binswanger and Rosenzweig also claim that the salient exception to  the
income-sharing, family-run farm enterprise,  the plantation system, with its
large-scale use of hired labor, can be explained by the inherent  technological
features of the crops  grown.  The plantation system is  only advantageous when
(i) there are  important scale economies  in processing and coordination problems
between harvesting and processing, as  in sugar cane, and/or  (ii)  the crops
require sustained care across  the usual crop cycles, which bars the use of
annual tenancy contracts.
1.  Casual and Permanent Laborers:  Spot and Future Markets for Labor
The  two classes of models,  one emphasizing risk and the other incentives,
problems, characterize  the literature concerned with explaining an important
feature of  the rural labor market--the coexistence of "casual" laborers, hired
on a daily basis in  the spot market, with "permanent" laborers, also called
attached farm servants, who are hired in advance  for multiple time periods at a
31fixed wage.  All models purporting to describe  the  "two-tiered" rural labor
market highlight the two-stage nature of agricultural technology.  The
production process  is described by  (19)  and (20),  instead of (1).
x - f(L1 ,A)  (19)
X - F(L2 ,A,x,8)  (20)
where x - intermediate output, a function of  first-period inputs, and e
represents exogenous  and stochastic  inputs beyond the control  of the farmer
(state of nature, weather).  The work force in period i is composed of casual
and permanent workers, the  latter being hired in both production periods.  Thus,
L i   Lp  +  Lci;  i - 1, 2.
Bell and Srinivasan (1985) and Bardhan  (1983) emphasize that the demand for
labor in the second stage of production cannot be known in advance because of
weather uncertainty.  As a consequence, both (net) buyers and sellers of labor
each year face riskiness  in the wages to be paid or received at the end of the
crop cycle.  A risk-averse landless household, the model predicts, would find it
optimal for at  least some members to enter into an annual  (futures) contract
that sets the  second-stage wage in advance  (the attached servant contract).
With some sellers  of labor  in the household using only the daily spot market and
others engaged as  attached farm servants, family income is hedged against wage
(and employment) risk;  for net purchasers of labor, use of both types  of labor
contracts also reduces exposure to risk.  Since  the attached servant contract
serves as an insurance substitute, if agents are risk-averse the  (certain)
income from the  annual contract will be less  than the expected income over the
year obtained from participation in the casual labor market, spot  (casual) wages
W  exceed permanent labor wages  (Wp)  in an equilibrium characterized by fully
compensatory wages differentials.  These models  thus imply that  the choice  of
32wage contract will depend on both the levels and sources  (riskiness) of
household non-labor income.
Despite  the apparent advantages  of annual  or crop-cycle wage contracts,
they do not appear to be important in all environments.  Bell and Srinivasan in
fact report that  in their sample from 20  Indian villages  "...most  households do
not have such contracts."  (p. 3),  although Bardhan finds them  to be prevalent in
the Indian State of West Bengal, from which his data are  taken.  These
particular risk-shedding models can explain the apparent  lack of interest  in
such contracts in some areas and not in others on the basis of differences  in
endowed (wage and output) risk, but this central  implication of these models has
not been tested.  One alternative possibility, not considered, is  that other
contractual arrangements may be superior;  as discussed below, output-sharing
arrangements also  diminish risk.  Moreover, participation by some household
members in non-agricultural activities also diminishes  the household's exposure
to agricultural wage uncertainty, and such opportunities may vary across
environments.  Another possibility is  that  second-stage wages co-vary positively
with gross  income from production (final-stage wages are high (low) when there
is  a lot of  (little) production to harvest);  wage risk does not independently
increase income risk for net purchasers of labor  in all  environments.
Eswaran and Kotwal's  (1985a) model of permanent wage contracts, in contrast
to  the stochastic price and output models, assumes away risk aversion and
instead emphasizes  incentives prob lems attendant to  eliciting unmonitorable
effort.  They assume that  (i) agents mazimize utility function (18),  (ii)  first-
period tasks in  (19)  are distinct from second-period tasks  in that effort cannot
be easily monitored in that period (tasks require discretion in period one),  and
(iii)  landlords can discern worker effort in period one at the completion of
period two.  A  permanent wage contract serves  to  elicit first-period effort;
33thus,  only permanent laborers are hired in the first period;  i.e.,  L1  =  L,  L2  =
L  +  L c  and Lj  - e*Nj,  where e* is the appropriate effort and Nj  - number of
workers of type j (j  - p,c).
What induces  (permanent) workers to supply effort at  level e*, despite its
disutility and unobservability, is the prospect of being fired (becoming a
casual laborer) when their  shirking is discovered at the end of the harvest
cycle.  Of course,  the  termination threat is only credible  if the utility from
not shirking exceeds the utility from shirking and being relegated to  the casual
labor market.  This must imply that permanent worker contracts are superior (in
terms of worker welfare,  inclusive of effort)  to a series of casual or  spot
contracts.  To see  this,  consider a time horizon of four periods  (two seasons).
The  (indirect) utility for an honest permanent worker, supplying e* of effort in
the first period, is  V(Wp,e*).  If  the per-period discount rate is  6, then it
must be true that a shirking worker, who supplies no effort in the first period
and then is fired at the end of the season, is  not better-off than an honest
worker;  i.e.,
V(Wpe*)  (1+6+62+63) > V(Wp,0) +  6V(Wp,e*) + 62V(0,0)  + 63  V(Wc,e*),  (21)
so  that, since V(O,0) <  V(Wp,e*) <  V(Wp,0),
V(Wp,e*)  (1+6)  >  6V(Wc,e*),  (22)
where Wc  is the casual worker wage rate.  Note that workers  can be monitored in
the second period of each season so that e* of effort  is always  supplied then.
Expression (22)  suggests that  there will be an excess  supply of permanent
workers,  since Wp will not be bid down to equate the per-season utilities of the
two types of workers, as  this would result in shirking and lower output.  No
unemployment must ensue, however, since,  in the absence of any other
34restrictions  on the technology and preferences, all workers can be employed as
casual  laborers.  In contrast  to  the wage-insurance models,  the Eswaran-Kotwal
model thus consists of  two classes of workers, one of which (the permanent
worker class)  is better off than the other.  Moreover, unlike the former models,
this model  implies little  (or no) turnover among the privileged permanent
workers;  permanence pertains both to  intra season and inter-year employment.
A shortcoming of the Eswaran-Kotwal wage-contract model  is  that  it does not
provide the assignment rules characterizing which workers  are in each class nor
does  it predict whether the daily wage rates of permanent workers Wp will exceed
or not  those of daily laborers Wc.  As  in the  literature concerned with wage
risk models, moreover, alternative contractual arrangements, in particular,
tenancy, that elicit effort under the same  set of technological assumptions, are
not considered, although the assumption that workers cannot validate  the
landlord's  assessment of their performance effectively rules out worker's
posting a performance bond.  And, of course,  the existence  of wage heterogeneity
across  individuals performing different tasks could be explained by worker
heterogeneity in innate or acquired skills.
2.  Tenancy Contracts
There has been considerable attention to  the contractual terms associated
with  the rental of land in the development literature, and no complete
discussion of this  literature will be attempted here  (see Chapter  ,  this
volume, and Otsuka and Hayami  (1986)).  The relevance  of the tenancy contract in
this context is  that  such contracts also  influence the allocation and returns to
labor.  Tenancy contracts are an important rural  institution in many low-income
countries--in Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, for example,  about 40 percent of
cultivated land is under tenancy;  in Taiwan, over half of cultivated land was
cultivated by tenants  in the 1930s.
The theoretical literature concerned with tenancy is  characterized by the
35same two themes as  the pure labor contract literature--leasing of land provides
landowners access  to unmarketable  inputs,  such as  labor effort, and/or the land
rental terms serve  to mitigate risk in production.  As noted, if there are
difficulties monitoring the effort of non-family workers,  the renting of land to
tenants for a fixed fee  (rent) transforms the workforce  to residual claimants
and solves  the effort problem.  This  one problem of eliciting labor effort
(worker's moral hazard),  however, is  insufficient  to explain the existence  (or
coxistence) of land tenancy contracts  in which owner and tenant share  the
proceeds of cultivation (sharecropping),  since such a contract may lead to an
inefficient allocation of resources  (inputs)  compared to  fixed rent  tenancy.
Consider the budget equation for a tenant who leases in land, self-
cultivates and works  in the labor market at a fixed wage w. Consumption of this
tenant farmer, CT ,  is  given by
cT  - cýX  - R +  Xo + wL,  (23)
where a  - share rent, R - fixed rent, X  - output from tenanted land, Xo  -
output from self cultivated land, and L - time  in wage labor market.  With the
utility function and technology described by (1) and  (2) as before,  the
equilibrium conditions for  the allocation of the tenant's  labor time  is
3XT  _X
wo- aa  . (24)
aT  o
Thus,  returns  to  labor  time are not equated across  all activities when a  is  less
than one.  In particular, in the absence of other contractual stipulations, the
marginal product of labor  (and other inputs) will be higher on sharecropped land
than on own-cultivated land and higher there  than the market price of labor.  It
has been argued (e.g.,  Cheung  (1969))  that  landlords would, as part of the
contract stipulate input  levels, such that labor and other  inputs would be
36allocated efficiently.  However, this  leaves open the question of the
enforceability of  labor effort, which was a rationale  for land rental  to begin
with - why does  the landowner not just charge a fixed fee  (let R >  0,  a =  1 in
(23)),  which results  in efficient allocations without monitoring?  There are  two
answers--avoidance  of risk and the existence of unmarketable  inputs owned by the
leasor.
If tenants  are  risk averse and output risk is uninsurable,  then lessees may
be unwilling to accept all of the risk of production, leaving the landowner
exposed only to the risk of nonpayment of the fixed fee that a fixed rental
entails.  By sharing output, landlords and tenants share production risk, and
share  it optimally when the optimal allocation of  inputs  on tenanted land is
enforceable.  As  Newbery  (1975) has pointed out, however,  risk reduction to the
same degree can be accomplished by the tenant  (without inefficiency) by his
allocating a share of his  time  to  risky activities  (self-cultivation) and a
share to a non risky activity, such as  afforded by an attached-servant  labor
contract.  While it may be argued that it  is difficult for one individual  to
divide up his time among activities  (transaction costs, market frictions),  the
existence of  the multi-member household, ignored in almost all tenancy models,
means  that  a family can allocate  each or some of  its members to different
activities.  Risk diversification and/or risk reduction may thus  be achieved
without  incurring transaction costs or sacrificing the returns  to
specialization.  The choice or prevalence of fixed rent and share  tenancy
contracts will then depend on the availability of alternative risk-reducing
opportunities.
Eswaran and Kotwal  (1985b) have set out a  framework that focuses directly
on the  issue of why certain forms of labor cum land arrangements are chosen over
others.  In their model, riskiness  is  ignored and the problem of obtaining
unmarketable  inputs plays a central  role.  They posit the existence of two
37productive factors  that cannot be bought or sold directly - managerial skill and
labor effort.  The prevalence of share, fixed rent or pure wage contracts  then
depends on both the importance of these two inputs  in production (the
technology) and the ownership distribution of the  inputs across landowners  and
tenants.  When owners of land have a monopoly on managerial knowledge  and only
tenancy can elicit unmonitorable labor effort from workers, owners and tenants
find it in their interest to  share their  inputs  through share tenancy.  A fixed-
rent tenancy is  inferior in this  case  since it provides no incentives for the
landowner to supply his skills  to production.  It is  the double coincidence of
moral hazard (two, not one, market failures) that makes share  tenancy
potentially superior to fixed rate  tenancy, even though neither tenant nor
landowner supplies  the full  level of his own input  that would be forthcoming
under self-cultivation.  This model thus suggests that as  landowners  lose their
managerial advantage relative to  tenants, due to  the  introduction of new
technologies or  through the acquisition of cultivation experience by tenants,
fixed rental becomes more likely;  as  labor tasks become more routinized, through
mechanization or other technological changes, the use of wage labor as opposed
to  tenancy contracts becomes more prevalent.
Empirical  studies pertinent  to  tenancy models have chiefly been devoted to
the narrowly-defined efficiency issue concerning whether share  tenancy induces
the withholding of inputs, as  implied in  (24),  and less  to the question of  the
determination of the choice of contractual forms.  The conceptual experiment
needed to  resolve  the input allocation question is  straightforward--compare  the
input allocations  (or marginal products) for the same farmer, on the same plot
of land, under the same weather conditions but under different contracts.
However, no survey has as yet produced information on such an experiment;
indeed, the probability of weather conditions being identical  in different years
is  zero!  Most of the empirical studies compare  input intensities across
38different farmers with different plots  of land and different contracts;  the
possibility that there  is heterogeneity in farmer's  characteristics or  land
which may importantly affect  the choice of contract and input allocations makes
such studies  inconclusive.  For example, Eswaran and Kotwal's model implies  that
less  competent tenant  farmers sharecrop rather than rent  (and possibly so do
less competent landowners);  sharecropping tenants may  thus appear  to be  less
productive, but not necessarily because of  insufficient incentives.  Studies by
Bell  (1977) and Shaban  (1986) of the  efficiency question exploit data that comes
closest  to  the best  experiment;  they were able to  compare  the  same farmer under
different contracts, but on different plots of  land.  Although there are
controls  for several different measured land characteristics, heterogeneity in
unobserved characteristics  of land may bias  the results, which appear consistent
with the input misallocation hypothesis  in that input intensities appear  to be
lower on sharecropped land compared to  self-cultivated land or to  land leased
under fixed rent.  No attempt was made in either of these studies  to measure or
compare marginal products of inputs across  contracts, however, which would have
required estimation of the  technology parameters.
The more fundamental issue of contract choice has received far less
empirical study.  As for permanent labor contracts, specific  forms of tenancy
contracts are prevalent  in some areas and not in others, even within the same
country.  For example,  in the Philippines 84  percent of rented land is
sharecropped, while  in Egypt only twelve percent of rented land is  leased on a
share basis.  In India,  90 percent of rented landholdings are sharecropped in
the  state of West Bengal  (where, it will be recalled, attached servant contracts
were also prevalent),  while in the Indian state of Madras,  78  percent of tenancy
contracts were fixed-rent  (National Sample Survey, Eighth Round).
The risk-based  tenancy models imply that differences  in the riskiness of
39the environment and the availability of less risky income opportunities can
explain tenancy contract choice.  The conceptual experiment is  again
straightforward--provide, randomly, different amounts of fixed payments across
potential tenants;  those receiving greater assured levels of income should be
more likely to select fixed rent contracts  (as long as risk-aversion is non-
increasing with wealth).  Such an experiment, of course, has not been performed.
Bell and Sussangkarn (1985) in an important study in a sense have attempted
to simulate  the riskless  income experiment, but based on information on tenants
from cross-section data.  They tested if tenants with greater  levels of transfer
income, greater numbers of non-agricultural family workers, and greater
landholdings were more willing to engage in riskier tenant contracts.  The
difficulty with this exercise is  that sources of income and the occupational
composition of the family labor  force are also attempts by the household to cope
with risk.  Indeed (non-governmental) net transfer  income is  in part the
manifestation of an implicit contract with non-household agents that presumably
is  designed to smooth consumption under risk.  The estimated associations
between different means of risk-coping  (contracts) and the outcomes of risk-
sharing arrangements does not shed much light on how opportunities for risk
reduction and environmental  (exogenous) risk in production influence  the
portfolio of explicit and implicit contracts.  Attached farm servant and share-
tenancy contracts are  in part substitutes for each other as risk-mitigating
mechanisms but are also more likely to be observed in risker environments or
among households who are risk-averse;  the sign of the association between
different contractual forms  is not obvious from the theory, nor therefore can it
represent a  test of the  insurance-based tenancy model.
The Eswaran-Kotwal  tenancy model, which focuses on the distribution of
managerial knowledge and the technology of supervision, suggests,  as noted, that
owners and tenants are more likely to  share  in allocation decisions under a
40share contract than under a fixed rent tenancy agreement.  Bell and Srinivasan
(1985), based on data from 10 villages  in the Punjab  in India, did, indeed, find
this  to be  true.  This model also  implies  that as  tenants acquire more
experience in farming, they will be less dependent  on the managerial  input of
the landowner and will thus  be more  likely to become fixed rent  tenants.  There
is as  yet little  information on this "tenancy ladder" implication or on how
technical  change, which may obsolesce land-specific experience, influences
contractual arrangements.  Longitudinal information on the life-cycle  land
relationships of rural agents would be useful in this  regard.  Such data could
also be helpful in testing the risk-insurance tenancy model in that  it might
allow better methods  for dealing with the problem that observationally-identical
tenants  are heterogeneous  in their aversion to risk, which jointly  influences
all of their contractual choices, and thus  the sources, variability and levels
of their incomes.
As noted, the complete markets models, since  they ignore incentives
problems and do not incorporate risk, cannot account  for sharecropping or
explain the mixture of contractual arrangements engaged in by farmers.  The
alternative models  that do accommodate these considerations, however, have
tended to  concentrate on one or another part of  the farm or household allocation
problem (choosing farm servants or daily laborers, choosing fixed or  share rent
tenancy contracts) to  the neglect of other  important decisions  (labor supply,
land rental, consumption choices) and narrowly define the range  of formal and
informal contractual alternatives.  The  compete markets model has thus seen the
most direct econometric applications;  econometrically tractable models of the
farm-household model embodying risk-behavior and contractual choice await
development.
III. GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY
41Whatever the absolute level of the marginal contribution to output of the
rural labor force, the reallocation of labor from less  to more productive
activities or sectors  is a central element in development models.  Moreover,
sectoral  or spatial disparities in the returns  to homogeneous labor, i.e.,
controlling for skill differences, are evidence of market imperfections,
although not necessarily of imperfections  in the labor market.  While, as noted,
mobility of labor across farms within small localities in rural areas  appears
high, there appears  to be evidence of  important spatial barriers  to mobility in
low-income countries.  Wage rates  for seemingly comparable tasks in agriculture
appear to differ persistently across  geographical areas  (Rosenzweig (1978))  and
even between adjacent villages, and "unskilled" manufacturing wage rates  in
urban areas have  remained, over long periods  of time,  from 1.5 to 2 times
agricultural wage rates  (Squire  (1982)),  although careful analyses  of real wage
differentials by skill group remain to be performed.  Indeed, a large part of
disparities  in wage rates can be explained by differentials in skill-related
attributes across workers  (e.g.,  schooling and work experience).
In his econometric analysis of the determination of rural wage rates across
districts in India, Rosenzweig (1978)  assumes inter-district immobility and
finds that, consistent with this assumption, within each district relative
supplies of male,  female and child labor influence the district's absolute  and
relative wage levels in accordance with classical supply-demand models.  Thus,
the spatial variation in relative male-female wage rates  appears at  least in
part to be determined by differentials in the relative supplies of female labor
associated with caste and religious  restrictions, and to demand factors
associated with locality-specific weather conditions, given stratification by
sex in agriculture tasks.  In Rosenzweig's  (1980) econometric analysis of labor
supply and wage  rate determination based on household data, the  findings suggest
42that women are less mobile than men (as  found also by Bardhan (1979) and Ryan
and Ghodake  (1984))  and that landless  laborers  are more geographically-mobile
than owners  of land.
There  is also  substantial evidence, however, of large population movements
in low-income countries, particularly from rural to  higher-wage urban areas.
Yap  (1975) reports  that migration typically accounts  for from 30  to  60 percent
of urban population growth rates  in such countries.  There thus appears  to be
both large  spatial population flows as  well as persistent spatial disparities in
labor returns.  Are there particular barriers to mobility  in low-income
countries?  Do  standard models of migration not pertain to  such settings?  A
large proportion of the  development economics literature  is  concerned with these
questions  of  the  mobility  of  labor.
1.  The  Basic  Human  Capital Model of Migration
The beginning point in modeling the migration decision of agents  is  the
human capital model.  In this  framework, migration is viewed as  an income-
augmenting investment in which costs are  incurred initially and returns  accrue
over  time.  An individual compares the direct costs  of migrating with the
discounted present value of income gains,  if any, from each potential
destination;  he or  she thus  finds the maximum of a set of potential migration
gains across all possible destinations, where the  gain Gj  for any destination j
is:
T
S  fe(-r)t  (Y  - Y  )dt  - c.,  (25)
0
cj  is  the cost of migration (transportation costs)  to  destination j,  YDj  is  the
per-period income  the individual would receive by migrating to j, Yo is per-
period origin income, and r  is  the discount rate.  Yo'  YD and c may also have
time  subscripts, may vary with age, although direct migration costs  are incurred
43all at once.  If max  (Gj) is  positive, then the potential migrant will choose to
move to  that destination with the highest gain.
The human capital migration model  in (25)  yields the following predictions,
aside  from the  implication that agents' migration choices will  tend to  erase
income differentials:  (i)  the young, who will reap returns over a longer
period, will have larger values of G and will be more mobile than the old, (ii)
neutral productivity growth across  areas or sectors  (given by g in  (18))  will
increase mobility;  that is,  accelerating along a balanced growth path, say in
urban and rural areas, will induce a greater absolute  differential in favor of
the high-income  (urban) area, increase G, and thus raise the level  of rural-
urban migration flows, and (iii)  a greater distance  (higher c) between two areas
reduces migration flows between them.  As Yap  (1977) reports  in her survey of
econometric studies  of internal migration in low-income countries,  there is
substantial evidence that,  indeed, the vast majority of migrants are young,
high-growth economies are characterized by high levels of migrant  flows, and
migration rates between any  two areas i and j  are positively related to  the size
of  the differential in real earnings  or wages across  i and j and are negatively
related to the distance between them.  Kuznets  (1982) also  concludes, based on
ILO data pertaining to 181 countries  from 1950 to  1970, that those countries
that had greater rates of growth of per-capita product also were marked by more
rapid shifts out of the agricultural sector, although it is  unclear whether the
growth rates were "balanced."
Like the perfect markets model, the simple human capital approach to
migration yields a  number of empirically-verified  implications but  abstracts
from a number of problems, some particularly relevant to low-income countries.
These include capital market and information constraints, uncertainty with
respect to both employment prospects and intertemporal income fluctuation, joint
household decision-making, and the existence of heterogeneity among agents  and
44in area-specific non-income attributes  (relative prices of goods  and services).
The model thus seeks  to  explain permanent rather than seasonal migration
and ignores multiple moves, assuming perfect foresight.  Additionally, without
introducing worker heterogeneity into  the model,  it  is difficult to  reconcile
the model with the observation  that migration streams often flow simultaneously
from place  i to  place j and from place j to  place i.  Nevetheless, the major
implication of this framework, that wage differences  across regions explains
interregional migration for comparably skilled workers, appears to  have received
strong support.
2.  Information and Capital Market Constraints  on Mobility
The importance of information flows  is used to explain why it  is usually
found that  the more educated are likely to be migrants  than the  less educated
and why distance between origin and destination is  less  of a migration deterrent
for the more educated  (e.g.,  Schwartz  (1969),  Levy and Wadycki  (1974)),  as  the
more educated are presumed to be better-informed about  spatially-separated
alternative earnings opportunities.  Similarly, the existence of information
sources  in destination areas is  presumed important and is  also consistent with
pervasive findings  that the stock of prior immigrants  to  an area j from a
destination i is positively correlated with current immigration flows from
origin i to j (e.g.,  Greenwood (1971)).  Such findings, however, may merely
reflect the persistence  of unmeasured factors influencing migration from i to  j.
Indeed, the interpretation of  the estimated effects of wage differentials on
migration flows based on specifications including lagged migration (the stock of
immigrants)  is not obvious, particularly when such variables are  treated
inappropriately as  exogeneous.  There  is,  however, more direct evidence of  the
positive influence  of destination-area contacts  on migration flows  (Nelson
(1979)).
45The findings that the more educated are likely  to be migrants and that
migrants, at least  to cities, tend not to  be from the poorest families  in the
origin area suggest that migration may be income-constrained.  Capital market
constraints may thus influence  the degree  to which returns to  labor remain
geographically diverse.  Basu (1983)  develops an alternative model in which
geographic wage diversity coexists with frictionless geographic mobility as  a
result of capital market  imperfections.  The risk of default is  assumed to
induce  landlords in rural areas to  confine their  lending to  laborers under
longer-term contract to them;  that is,  to  borrowers over whom they have more
"control" or information.  Basu then explains  spatial wage diversity as
reflecting differentials in interest costs  to moneylenders  (landlords) across
areas--the contractual interlocking of loans and wage payments  implies that
laborers choose among alternative wage-interest cost contracts.  With complete
labor mobility, the utility value of the different combined wage-interest
contracts must be  equal  (for homogenous  laborers) across areas.  Thus, where
interest costs are high (for landlords),  wage rates offered by landlords  to
laborer-borrowers  must also be high.  Basu thus views capital immobility,
combined with incentives problems, as  the principal cause of spatial wage
diversity.  Of course,  the reasons why capital  costs are not arbitraged
spatially is  not indicated, nor is  there any evidence presented or cited on
flows of capital.  Moreover, as noted above, labor contracts  of more  than one
day are not prevalent in many rural  labor markets;  the interlinked credit-pure
wage  labor contract is  thus not adequate  to explain the pervasiveness  of spatial
rural wage differentials.
A more direct capital market cum information constraint on labor mobility
in rural areas is  suggested by the findings that  (i) laborers with land are less
mobile than the landless  (Rosenzweig (1980))  and  (ii) migrants  to urban areas
from households owning land in rural areas are more likely to be temporary
46migrants,  (e.g.,  Balan et al.  (1973),  Nabi  (1984)).  If households  owning land
are unable, or find it difficult, to  sell their holdings,  then movement out of
the  rural area by the household entails a capital loss.  Indeed, Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1985) show that in India less  than two percent of  landowners sell any of
their land  in a given year, and almost all who do,  do  so because of severe cash
constraints  induced by at least two consecutive years  of poor weather.  However,
they also provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that variability in
land qualities across plots  combined with weather risk leads  to  specificities in
plot-specific  experience (information) returns.  Thus, even when land markets
operate perfectly farmers  incur a capital loss upon the  sale of land they and
their family have farmed.  Mobility is  reduced because part of the capital
accumulated by farmers  is not transportable.
3.  Two-Sector Unemployment Equilibrium Models
Another way to reconcile persistent disparities between unskilled urban and
rural wages with unfettered labor mobility  is  to assume  that the risk of finding
a higher wage urban job  is not negligible and that potential migrants take
employment risk into account.  In Todaro  (1969),  the basic human capital model
of migration is modified so  that the per-period income flow  in the urban sector
is weighted by the probability of  obtaining a job  in that  sector;  G  becomes
G'j..
T
G  - e(g-r)t  (p(t)YD  - Y)dt - c.  (26)
where p(t)  is  the destination  (urban) employment probability.  G  is now the
expected net return from migration, and is clearly lower than Gj  as long as
p(t)  <  1  .
Harris and Todaro  (1970), based on the model of Todaro  (1969),  embed the
notion of employment risk into  a two-sector general equilibrium model of
47migration, employment and wage determination.  In this model, wages are
determined competitively (by supply and demand) in the rural  sector, but the
wage rate  in the urban sector  is  an institutionally set ("politically
determined")  rigid minimum wage set above the  initial rural wage.  Employment is
a Bernoulli process  in which the probability of employment in the urban sector
is  equal  to the number of urban jobs  (EU) divided by the size of the urban labor
force or number of job seekers  (NU).  Since all agents  are assumed to maximize
G' (are risk neutral),  and are perfectly mobile, and the rural wage  (-  marginal
product  in agriculture)  is  origin income,  the unemployment equilibrium condition
is:
WR  - WU(EU/Nu);  (27)
i.e.,  the rural wage  is equal to  the expected urban wage.  Thus, in this model
the only labor market distortion is  in the urban sector  (and is unexplained;  see
below);  the  institutionally-set urban wage  leads  to a misallocation of labor
resources across areas and to wasted resources  (unemployed workers).
Given the  technology of production in the urban and rural sectors  ,(described
in Harris and Todaro by standard, neoclassical  functions with fixed capital
stocks and mobile labor as  inputs) and a fixed total endowment of labor in the
economy, equation (27)  describes how rural wages, urban unemployment and rural
and urban employment change when the exogenously-determined institutional wage
is  altered.  In the case in which labor demand in the urban sector  is  inelastic
(demand elasticity < 1),  a rise  in the minimum wage  reduces employment and
output in both the rural and urban sectors and increases urban unemployment.  In
that case, when the minimum wage increases, employment decreases proportionally
less than the urban wage  increase, leading to an increase  in the expected urban
wage and increased migration from the rural  to  the urban sector.  However, if
urban demand is  elastic, a rise  in the urban minimum wage increases  rural output
48and lowers the wage  in the agricultural  sector;  in that case, migration flows
from the urban sector  to  the rural sector.  In either case, an exogenous
increase in urban employment brought on, say, by an urban wage subsidy induces
migration from the rural to  the urban sector and increases the number of urban
unemployed, since  the urban (minimum)  wage  is unaffected.
It  is  the  seemingly paradoxical result that urban wage subsidies  increase
the  size of  the urban unemployment pool that apparently has made  the Harris-
Todaro version of the two-sector unemployment equilibrium model of interest.
Moreover, the basic idea that migrants pay attention to  destination employment
prospects as well as wage levels appears consistent with the evidence  obtained
in many econometric migration studies  (e.g.,  Levy and Wadycki,  (1972)).
However,  if nominal urban manufacturing wages are taken as  representative of the
urban wage,  then the magnitude of actual urban unemployment rates  does not
reconcile the observed rural-urban wage differential, does not balance  (27)--
nominal urban manufacturing wages are  allegedly from 50  to  100 percent higher
than nominal rural  agricultural wages, while urban unemployment rates  are
typically less  than 10 percent.
One way to solve the problem that the Harris-Todaro framework appears to
overpredict unemployment rates  is  to  carefully measure sectoral wage differences
for comparable classes of workers and to  appropriately allow for sectoral cost
of living differentials.  Careful empirical studies of the alleged wage gap have
been absent.  Instead, researchers have modified  the model, adding, for example,
an additional sector  to the urban area--workers are assumed to queue  for the
high-wage urban jobs, not in the unemployment  line, but in an urban informal,
subsistence, or  "murky" sector (where the minimum wage presumably does not
pertain),  as in Fields  (1974) and Cole and Sanders  (1985).  Presumably, the
weighted average of urban high (minimum) wages, weighted by the urban
49unemployment rate,  and lower murky-sector wages is  approximately equal to the
rural wage.  However, it  is difficult to measure the return to  labor in the
informal urban sector  (see below) and, again, little empirical evidence exists
on this component of this modified, three-sector balance equation.  In addition,
despite  the critical role  that the magnitude of the urban demand elasticity
plays in the Harris-Todaro model  (see also Mincer  (1976)),  there  is  little or no
evidence  to support  the assumption that the urban aggregate demand elasticity is
less  than one.
An unsatisfying feature of the Harris-Todaro model itself  is  that the
source of the  labor market imperfection, the urban minimum wage, is  determined
outside  the model in an ad hoc manner.  While governments do  impose binding
minimum wages,  it is  difficult to believe that the fixed wages would be set
independently of unemployment or migration rates.  The evidence on how
constraining governmentally-imposed minimum wages are  in urban areas is not
clear in any event  (Squire (1982)).  Stiglitz  (1974) and Calvo  (1978) have
attempted to  rectify this shortcoming of the Harris-Todaro framework.  Calvo
assumes monopolistic behavior by urban labor unions  to obtain an equilibrium
wage differential.  Stiglitz formulates  a two-sector unemployment equilibrium
model  in which urban unemployment results from the behavior of competitive urban
firms;  urban wages and urban unemployment along with rural wages are  thus
endogenously-determined in these models.  As in the Harris-Todaro model,
moreover, there  is no rural unemployment, and rural wages are competitively set
(the nutrition-efficiency wage model  is not employed).
In the Stiglitz model, monopolistically-competitive  firms  in the urban
sector incur hiring and training costs associated with labor  turnover and set
wages to minimize the cost per worker.  The  total labor costs CL of the firm are
assumed to be given by:
50CL =  WL  +  qtL,
where L - firm's labor force,  t - training or hiring costs per worker, and q =
probability that an employee leaves  the  firm (quit rate).  As in the efficiency
wage model,  labor costs are both directly and indirectly a function of  the wage
rate paid by the  firm, here because  it  is  assumed that the quit rate declines as
the firm's wage increases.  Unlike  in the efficiency wage model, however, worker
costs  (turnover) are a function of relative, not absolute, wage rates and are
influenced by the unemployment rate.  In particular, Stiglitz assumes  that
q  q(WU/WeU, WU/WR,U),  (29)
where WeU - mean wage of all other urban firms, U =  urban unemployment rate, and
qi  < 0, i  - 1, 2, 3.  That is,  workers are less likely  to quit if the rewards  in
the firm in which they are  employed are high relative  to  those of their
alternatives, namely migrating to  the  rural sector or becoming unemployed.  The
firm can only use  its own wage as  an instrument to minimize  (28);  moreover, in
equilibrium all wages  in the urban sector will be equal  (WU  - WeU).  The wage
paid by urban firms will  thus be a function of  the unemployment rate and the
rural wage, and in equation  (27)  all components of  the equilibrium equation are
endogenously-determined.
The consequences of a wage subsidy (financed by a profit tax) differ
between the Harris-Todaro and Stiglitz  "turnover" models of unemployment
equilibrium.  In the former, wage subsidies, up to a certain point,  increase the
economy's total  output.  In  the  turnover model, however, wage subsidies lower
output.  This  is because part of the wage subsidy is  partially shifted to
workers  (which cannot happen in the rigid wage model).  The rise  in employment
and the urban wage  leads unambiguously  to a rise in the urban unemployment rate,
from  (28).
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(28)An important  feature of Stiglitz's turnover model is  that urban
unemployment  is not only endogenous but  is optimal,  in the sense  that if the
government chose  the urban wage and urban employment levels so as  to maximize
total output in the economy (allowing free migration),  it would set the urban
wage above the rural wage and allow a non-zero level of unemployment.  The lost
output due  to  (optimal) unemployment is  less than the gain to output from the
lower turnover costs--unemployment prospects  and the urban-rural wage gap
"discipline" workers and lower  labor costs.  This unemployment  result, and all
of the welfare-theoretic  implications of the model, rest on the assumption that
a firm (government) can only influence turnover via the wage it pays.  Indeed,
none of the costs  of turnover are borne by workers.  The optimality of
unemployment comes  about because of the artificial restriction placed on the
types of contractual arrangements the firm can engage in with its  labor  force.
As has been well established in the human capital literature  (Becker (1975)),
for example, when workers are  free to  leave firms and training is  specific  to a
firm, as assumed in the Stiglitz model where trained workers receive no higher
wages than untrained workers,  sharing of the costs of training with workers is
optimal.  When workers  incur part of the costs of their training and thus share
in the returns from that training, they incur a capital  loss when they leave the
firm, as  the training is not valued elsewhere  in the economy.  The sharing of
training costs  and the wage wedge between the  firm where the specific  training
was undertaken and other firms eliminates the need for the pool of unemployed or
the rural-urban wage gap  to  serve as  turnover deterrents.
The firm behavior embedded in the Stiglitz  turnover model,  its  essential
ingredient, implies  that worker's wage rates do not rise over time, as employees
neither pay for nor obtain the rewards from training costs.  However, pervasive
evidence from a  large number of countries suggests  that urban workers wages rise
over their life-cycle, consistent with such workers financing at  least some
52investment costs and reaping returns.  There  is no  evidence supporting the
training arrangements assumed in and fundamental to  the Stiglitz turnover model.
Fry (1979) tests a turnover model similar to  that of Stiglitz, by
ascertaining if workers who are less  likely to remain with a firm are  also less
likely to  receive  training.  Again, all costs are assumed to be borne by firms.
He  finds that among urban workers  in Zambia, those from the poorest backgrounds
were more likely  to be trained as a consequence of  their being less likely to
return home.  This  finding, however,  is perfectly consistent with a model  in
which workers, anticipating how long  they intend to  remain with a firm, choose
to  incur training costs.  The data do not indicate who finances the  training;
moreover, Fry does not attempt  to  test whether wage rates rise with tenure in
the  firm in order to  test  the assumption that workers  do not invest in training.
Finally, Stiglitz  (1982) also develops unemployment equilibrium models
incorporating equilibrium condition  (27)  in which (i) the absolute magnitude of
the wage paid by a firm raises worker effort (the efficiency wage model without
nutritional underpinnings) and  (ii)  the wage paid by the firm relative  to wages
paid by other firms determines  the firm's ability to  recruit high quality
workers  (the  "efficiency wage-quality" modbl).  In these models, unemployment
persists, even when the government sets urban wages and employment to maximize
total  output.  No evidence appears  to exist  to  support the critical behavioral
assumptions  that are the basis of  the effort-wage  or quality-wage relationships,
and no consideration is  given in these models  to  the possible superiority of
alternative contractual arrangements  that minimize shirking or optimally sort
workers and do not entail unemployment.
4.  Risk, Remittances and Family Behavior
The two-sector unemployment equilibrium (UE) models do not contain features
special  to  low-income countries.  Indeed, a similar model to  that of Harris and
53Todaro has been applied to describe  the employment effects  of minimum wages
across  covered and uncovered sectors in the United States  (Mincer (1976)),  and
turnover costs and problems of worker effort and recruitment are not especially
confined to low-income urban areas.  More  importantly, neither the basic human
capital model nor the UE models can readily explain temporary migration--planned
return migration--or the directions and magnitudes of cross-area resource
transfers associated with migration.  Yet in the African setting that the UE
model was designed to  describe, the vast majority of urban migrants state that
they intend to return to  their rural home, had left their wives and children in
their origin area, and/or owned land in the rural area  (e.g.,  Kenya (Rempel
(1974),  Harris and Todaro  (1970)).  Moreover,  flows of funds--remittances--from
urban migrants to family members  in home areas  in both Africa and South Asia
account for ten to  twenty-five percent of urban migrants' incomes  (Rempel and
Lobdell  (1978)).  The negative  impact of migration on incomes  in rural areas  is
thus overestimated by the UE model.
Temporary migrants might be considered members of a geographically extended
family described by the income-sharing household model of (1),  (2) and (5).  In
such a model, when the consumption of each member enters an additively-separable
household utility function, it is easy to  show that family members  (temporary
migrants) with wages  above the mean consumption level of the  family will
transfer funds to other members  (origin members) until consumption levels of all
members are equalized.  Thus, remittances will be greater the higher is  the
income of the migrant member and lower  the higher are the pre-remittance  incomes
of the origin family members.
The geographically-extended joint household model is  not entirely an
adequate explanation of temporary migration.  First, it does not explain why, if
incomes are higher where  the temporary migrant resides, the entire family does
not move to  the high-income area.  Second, it does not explain, without resort
54to  arbitrary assumptions  about preferences, why higher-income migrants remit
funds  to  their lower-income parents  or other relatives at origin.  Third, the
available evidence  from national probability samples from Kenya (Knowles and
Anker  (1981))  and Botswana  (Lucas and Stark (1985))  suggests  that while the
migrant's income  is positively related to  the  size of transfer made to  the
origin family,  in accordance with the model, remittances are not negatively
related to  the pre-transfer income  or wealth of the origin household members, as
the joint household model also predicts.  Finally, the model does not explain
why geographically extended families should be prevalent in low-income but not
in high-income countries.
As noted, an important feature of low-income  countries  is  the inability of
farmers to  insure against production risk.  Since farming is by far the
principal occupation in low-income settings  compared to high-income  countries,
attention to risk-induced behavior may illuminate spatial labor mobility in such
areas.  Note  that the rural household, by diversifying its  spatial portfolio of
income sources,  reduces total  income risk in a context (agriculture) in which
the principal  source of risk is  locational.  Even occupational diversification
among co-resident family members may not be adequate  in rural areas where
incomes from agriculture significantly influence non-agricultural activity
levels. Thus,  temporary migration of rural household members may be a
manifestation of a familial, risk-sharing insurance contract, with remittances
reflecting both insurance payoffs  and compensation for the family's  investment
costs  incurred in sending the migrant away or  in financing his/her schooling.
The migrant's income net of his  (temporary migrants are predominantly male)
transfers may be higher than that of his rural kin, reflecting compensation for
the disutility of being away from home.  Finally, incentives  for remitting may
be provided by prospects of inheritance, as  in the bequest model of Kotlikoff
55and Spivak (1981).
Lucas  and Stark  (1985) is  the first study to  attempt to  test the household-
theoretic approach to  temporary migration and remittances.  Based on a national
survey of households  in Botswana, they find evidence consistent with the
hypotheses  that  (i) temporary migration is  in part a co-insurance arrangement,
as remittances are higher when family incomes  are temporarily low, (ii)
prospects of bequests influence  remittance flows positively as  well as who
migrates, as  (male) migrants  from wealthier  (larger cattle herd) families send
more remittances and sons are more likely to  inherit  in Botswana, and (iii)
remittances rise with the migrant's  (predicted) earnings  and schooling.  The
latter finding is  interpreted as  indicating that remittances  reflect in part the
repayment of investment costs undertaken by the family on behalf of the migrant.
Lucas and Stark's findings  are suggestive of  the complexity of household
arrangements.  They do not, however, derive their hypotheses within the context
of a rigorously-formulated, integrated model of the household incorporating
risk-sharing via formal labor or tenancy contracts,  intergenerational  and
spatial transfers, wealth accumulation and/or bargaining.  Moreover, their
finding that family wealth and remittances are positively associated could
merely reflect the greater ability of households receiving remittances to
accumulate wealth, rather than the bequest motive or the absence  of altruistic
income-sharing (which implies a negative wealth-remittance correlation).
Longitudinal  data may be required to distinguish among hypotheses.  As  in the
case of contractual arrangements  involving labor, richer models  of the family
enterprise appear needed to understand fully the complex nature of the spatial
mobility of labor.
5.  Heterogeneity and Selective Migration
All of the models of migration discussed assume that potential migrants are
concerned only with income.  However, areas are also differentiated by or
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may value differentially).  Thus, wage disparities across urban and rural areas
may be consistent with a hedonic equilibrium in which  the higher wages of the
city compensate new city dwellers for the  lost amenities of rural life.  The
utility associated with the high-wage, urban squalor bundle may be no greater
than the utility associated with low-wage rural  life for the representative
agent.
Schultz  (1983) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1984),  based on separate
household data sets  from Colombia, found that migration behavior  is  influenced
by characteristics of areas other than income prospects  (i.e.,  relative prices).
Moreover, their results  suggest that households are heterogenous  in their
preferences.  Households appeared to differentially sort themselves  across
localities differing in relative prices.  In particular, households who migrated
exhibited different fertility and health investment behavior prior to  their
migration compared to observationally identical households at both origin and
destination.  Such differences appeared consistent with households,
characterized by differing demands  for human capital investments, being
differentially  influenced by spatial diversity in the relative prices of such
investments.  The selective migration of households heterogenous  in preferences
may thus bias estimates based upon cross-sectional associations between the
average behavior of populations containing residents and migrants  and locality-
specific program subsidies and/or relative prices.
Heterogeneity among individuals  in earnings ability may also account  for
the urban-rural wage gap,  even when such measured characteristics as  schooling
and age are  taken into account.  To the  extent that a proportion of the
population in urban areas  in low-income countries consists  of relatively recent
migrants, and  (self-selected) migrants have superior earnings  abilities  in
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overestimate the return to migration for  the non-mobile.  Indeed, the human
capital migration model  implies that those individuals with the highest returns
from migration would be the most likely to migrate.  Comparison of the wages of
(origin) individuals who choose not to migrate with those  (destination)
individuals who migrate may thus lead to the false conclusion that  there is
underinvestment  in migration.
Robinson and Tomes  (1983) were  the first to  test the earnings  ability
migration selectivity hypothesis.  Applying standard, two-stage selection
correction procedures (Heckman (1974))  to household data from Canada, they found
that returns  to migration were significantly overestimated when such selectivity
was not taken into account--persons who moved to  an area j from area i earned
more  in j than those who did not move from i would have earned in j.  Almost all
samples from low-income countries provide earnings  information only for migrants
at destination and for non-migrants at origin;  few estimates  of migration
behavior or  the returns  to migration in such settings have taken into account
this selectivity problem.
IV.  URBAN LABOR MARKETS
1.  Diversity and Unemployment
The environment  in which labor markets operate  in urban areas  is  different
in three  important respects from that  in rural  areas.  First, there is
substantially more heterogeneity in the products produced;  technologies are  thus
diverse, requiring a wide variety of worker activities and skills.  Second,
production in urban areas  is not as highly seasonal or as highly sensitive  to
weather variations.  Third, production activities are, definitionally, not as
geographically dispersed as  in rural  agriculture.
These technological features of the urban environment have  important
58implications for the operation of the urban labor market.  Production diversity
is  likely to be manifested in heterogeneity in the rewards  to  labor to  the
extent that  (i) individuals differ in innate talents and these are
differentially productive across technologies  (products) and/or  (ii)  there  are
cross-sector differences  in the productivity of acquired skills  (through
schooling or via job  training).  Whether this  technological complexity
translates  into differences in payments  to labor  services among people with the
same skills depends  on the extent of labor mobility.  The high density of urban
areas suggests  that mobility costs--inclusive  of the cost of information flows--
are lower  in urban than in rural areas;  "natural" barriers to  mobility are less.
The  existence of technological differentials  in rewards to  different worker
characteristics, however,  implies  that the payoffs  to  search,  to  finding the
right match, are high.  Thus, periods of  search, particularly  for new entrants
to  the labor force  for whom the payoffs are  received over  the  longest period
and/or for persons with specialized skills, may be long.  Indeed, unemployment
rates  in urban areas  are significantly higher than they are  in rural  areas of
low-income countries  and are predominantly concentrated among the young and the
more educated, far more so  than in rural areas.  Table 2 provides the ratios of
urban to  rural unemployment rates and urban youth to  overall urban unemployment
rates  for a number of diverse countries that display these characteristics.
Urban areas of low-income countries, also  in contrast to  rural areas, are
also characterized by more intensively regulated labor markets.  Unlike  in
agriculture, many urban industries  are subject  to minimum wage restrictions and
to  laws governing employment conditions and worker layoffs, although there is
typically as well a  largely unregulated service  sector.  Workers may, in
addition, participate  in formal, publicly-administered unemployment  insurance
schemes.  Moreover, again unlike in most rural agricultural environments, trade
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Ratios of Urban to Rural and Young Male to  Total Male
Unemployment Rates  in Selected Low-Income Countries
Ratio
Males Aged 15-24
Country  Urban to  Rural  to Male Total  Year
Chile  3.1  n.a.  1968
Colombia  n.a.  2.1  1968
India  1.7  1.4  1972-73
Republic  of Korea  4.1  1.8  1965
Malaysia  1.6  2.4  1971
Philippines  1.9  2.2  1967
Trinidad  1.9  1.9  1971
Source:  Squire  (1981)unions may play a large  role  in determining the pricing and allocation of labor
and,  in some areas,  the government is one of  the most important employers.
Unemployment  differentials between the urban and rural areas  thus may  in part be
due to  publicly-enforced labor market restrictions, as  assumed in the Harris-
Todaro model, but also may reflect the  inherent differences between the  two
environments.
An informed reader will see  that most of  the features of the  low-income-
country urban environments described also characterize urban areas  of high-
income countries.  And the  issues of the impact of governmental labor market
interventions and trade unions and the determinants and consequences of job
search strategies, which appear to be particularly pertinent to such settings,
form an important part of the core of modern labor economics.  Few distinct
analytical models specifically targeted in any meaningful way to problems  of
low-income country urban labor markets have emerged in the literature.
2.  Urban  Dualism  and  Dual  Labor  Markets
There are some distinct features of low-income urban settings.  Chief among
them is  the importance of family-based enterprises, as  in agriculture.  And,
presumably, the consumption-production household models, applied principally to
rural settings,  are of use in understanding urban-based labor market phenomena.
A problem in studying such enterprises is  that even in this sector of the urban
economy, product diversity  (e.g. food shops,  automobile  shops, pharmacies)
almost precludes estimation of  "the"  technology that  is  importantly influencing
production and consumption decisions  in such households.
The contrast between the organization of small-scale family enterprises and
the large  industrial firms  that coexist in urban settings has led to  the
emergence of a  literature characterizing the urban sector as  dualistic  (Fields
(1975), Mazumdar  (1977),  Sabot  (1977)).  This  approach emphasizes  differences
between the urban "informal" sector, characterized by small,  family-based firms,
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legal restrictions,  i.e.,  characterized by more institutionalized (rigid) wage
setting procedures.  Such a characterization is purely descriptive, having no
predictive content.  The vast empirical literature on urban labor markets in
low-income countries, influenced by this framework, however, focuses on testing
the hypothesis  that there are barriers  to mobility across these  sectors, that
there are two distinct labor markets with workers on average better off in one
sector  than  in  the other.
In these empirical studies, wages or earnings  of workers of given measured
human capital characteristics  (schooling, age) are compared across different
types  of  firms  as  indicated  by  firm  size  or  firm  ownership  type;  e.g.,  public,
private,  multinational,  family-based.  Findings  of  wage  differences  by  firm  size
for  workers  of  given schooling and some measure of potential labor market
experience are  common (e.g.,  Mazumdar  (1981))--workers  in larger firms earning
more  than  workers  of  smaller  firms.  How are such findings to be  interpreted?
Do  they  suggest  barriers  to  mobility--non-competing  groups--or  do  they  merely
reflect compensatory differentials, rewards for unmeasured skills or
compensation for unmeasured differences  in the disutility of the workplace?
First, technological differences in production across  industries,  sectors
and products may entail different organizations, inclusive of operational scale,
and possibly different contractual wage payments.  Thus,  some sectors  (firms)
may "require"  specific job skills and others may need to reward productivity by
delayed incentives  arrangements when the outcomes of effort are not  immediately
observed (Lazear (1979)).  In that case  life-cycle wage  schedules may differ
across  firms and cross-sectional differences in wages among workers of the same
age or years in  the labor market may not reflect any differences in lifetime
earnings.  Second, if workers are heterogeneous  in unmeasured skills and such
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judgment may be greater, for example),  then seemingly identical employees  of
firms of different size may have different lifetime earnings  (Rosen (1981)).
A third reason that such  studies may find intersectoral wage differences  is
that  the earnings of family workers  in family-based enterprises reflect  the
contribution of other production factors, since such workers are residual
claimants;  their earnings are not comparable to  those of salaried employees or
wage workers.  The relevant comparison is  the marginal product of labor in
family enterprises with the wage rates of employees  in other sectors  (among
"comparable" workers).  This  requires the estimation of the family enterprise
technology, not an "earnings" function, and is made problematical by the
heterogeneity of technology in the urban sector.
A second class of empirical studies  in the "dualistic" tradition tests if
the  structure of the  relationship between earnings  and worker characteristics
differs  across two  sectors or earnings groups.  A difficulty with this "dual
labor market" approach,  (Cain (1976)),  in addition to  some of those measurement
and interpretation problems mentioned, is  the  seeming arbitrariness of  (i) there
being only two non-competing groups,  (ii)  the qualitative criterion for grouping
(firm size, earnings  level, etc.)  and/or  (iii)  the quantitative cutoff points.
Moreover, as discussed in Heckman and Hotz  (1986),  such tests require that the
selectivity bias associated with workers allocating themselves across sectors
(income groups) according to unmeasured earnings characteristics be taken into
account and that the assumed functional form of the earnings  relationship  (whose
parameters are hypothesized to differ across groups) be correct.
Misspecification of the earnings  function and/or the process sorting workers
across groups may lead to highly misleading inferences.  This problem, in its
generality,  is not unique  to  these hypothesis tests, however.  It is  the lack of
a precise behavioral interpretation of  the results that  is the principal
62shortcoming of the dualistic labor market empirical studies
V.  CONCLUSION
The starting point for most studies concerned with labor markets  in low-
income countries is  the assumption of some market distortion.  Solid empirical
research documenting many alleged distortions, however, has been relatively
scarce.  Where  careful work has been carried out, e.g.,  econometric estimation
of farm household behavior and wage determination, rural unemployment
measurement, many of the pre-suppositions  of development theorists have been
shown to be wrong or overemphasized.  Moreover,  the most important of the
alleged distortions characterizing labor markets, the persistance of spatial
differentials in real wages for workers within homogeneous skill classes, has
received relatively little  documentation, despite  the multiplicity of models
designed to explain such phenomena.  As many policies  carried out or promoted
are supported by reference to the  inefficiencies associated with the  "natural"
distortions existing in labor markets,  the accumulation of evidence on the
magnitudes of distortions as well as empirical evidence relevant to  the
implications of models incorporating market problems remains a high priority.
The growth rate  of empirical evidence pertinent to  markets and agents'
behavior in low income environments, particularly in rural areas, has  increased
rapidly in recent years.  In part as a result, the development economics
literature concerned with the allocation of labor in low-income countries has
moved from its emphasis on rigidities  and distortions to  focusing on the range
of alternative arrangements and mechanisms employed by agents in such countries.
Characterizations of low-income settings  as composed of capitalist farms and
family farms, of formal and informal sectors and even as agricultural and non-
agricultural or rural and urban significantly understate the mobility of agents
63in such environments and overlook some essential  features of these areas.  We
have seen that  in many settings almost all farming households import  (hire)
labor from and export  (supply) labor to  the market, a substantial fraction of
income  in rural  farm households has  its source  in the non-agricultural sector
(30 percent in India  (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985)),  considerable resources  flow
between family members located in rural and urban areas,  and many workers  in
urban areas have immediate family members and own  land in rural areas  to which
they eventually return.
There has also been increased recognition that an important aspect of low-
income labor markets is  the variety of arrangements used to  cope with risk and
information problems, from formal  futures contracts  to  informal  intra-family
transfer arrangements, and the spatial variability  of these important
institutions.  Yet models developed to describe  rural behavior have  generally
focused on only one  type of arrangement, ignoring alternative arrangements and
thus  the  important question of contractual choice.  Little  is  thus known about
how flexible both prices and contractual arrangements are to  change. The  choice-
theoretic models imply  that prices, contractual terms and the mix of
institutions presumably respond importantly to  technological changes,
particularly if they reduce or mitigate problems such  institutions are designed
to  alleviate.  New substitute  arrangements such as  governmental efforts  to
increase  the availability of credit or to  improve water control may also
influence  the mix of "traditional" institutions,  inclusive of traditional family
living arrangements.  But there  is  little detailed, micro time-series
information on and few integrative models pertinent to these important changes
that accompany the transformation of agriculture (Timmer, Chapter  ).  The
literature is not yet ready to predict the  full range of consequences of
interventions in the rural  sector designed to encourage productivity growth,
reduce  disparities in incomes  or reduce  apparent inefficiencies and distortions.
64Even less is  understood about the degree of life-cycle and
intergenerational mobility experienced by agents  in low-income countries.  How
rigid is  the distinction between types of workers?  Do wage earners remain as
wage workers all  their lives?  How open are opportunities for using allocative
or  entrepreneurrial  skills, e.g.,  is  tenancy a route to  land ownership?
Longitudinal and/or retrospective life-history data, now scarce, may provide an
essential base for examining such issues and for model formulation aimed at
integrating capital accumulation with labor allocation.  In addition, more focus
on the family as  the central allocating mechanism may be warranted  (see, for
example,  Pollak  (1985)).  Understanding the causes and consequences of the
transformation of institutional arrangements, formal and informal;  the processes
by which skills are accumulated, and the mobility of households and individuals
lies at  the core of development economics.  Only what appears  to be a promising
foundation for an enquiry into these  issues appears to have been established.
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